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Abstract
We develop a dual control method for approximating investment strategies in incomplete
environments that emerge from the presence of market frictions. Convex duality enables the
approximate technology to generate lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function.
The mechanism rests on closed-form expressions pertaining to the portfolio composition,
whence we are able to derive the near-optimal asset allocation explicitly. In a real financial
market, we illustrate the accuracy of our approximate method on a dual CRRA utility
function that characterizes the preferences of some finite-horizon investor. Negligible duality
gaps and insignificant annual welfare losses substantiate accuracy of the technique.
Keywords: Convex analysis, incomplete markets, life-cycle investment, Malliavin calucus, martingale
duality, stochastic optimal control
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1 Introduction
The impossibility to acquire closed-form solutions to a myriad of portfolio
choice problems advocates the design of approximate methods. This failure to arrive
at explicit expressions depends on the agent’s preference qualifications and technical
assumptions on the subject of undiversifiability in the financial environment, cf. Kim and
Omberg (1996), Wachter (2002) and Liu (2006). To avoid this inability, we propose a
dual control technique for approximating the dynamic asset allocation in markets that
∗Corresponding author. Mailing Address: t.kamma@maastrichtuniversity.nl. PO Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands. Phone: +31 (0) 43 388 3695.
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embed general trading constraints for an expansive set of preference conditions. The
technology that we delineate in this article is tractable, for it finds its merits in closed-form
expressions as to the portfolio composition that we collect through Malliavin calculus. We
assess the accuracy of our approximating mechanism by means of a utility loss criterion,
which emanates as a result of the available duality bounds. Convex martingale duality in
relation to artificial markets namely enables us to provide lower and upper bounds on the
optimal value function. Insignificant duality gaps and welfare losses varying between 1
and 5 basis points allude to near-optimality of the method.
Constrained consumption and portfolio choice problems are typically difficult to solve.
Therefore, it is conventional to resort to an examination of their corresponding duals.
In the influential papers by Karatzas et al. (1991a), Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992), and
Xu and Shreve (1992) the authors show that these primal and dual problems reconcile
through a barrier cone which relates the choice of respectively a controlled allocation to
assets to the market prices of risk. In fact, the dual problem induces a so-called fictitious
economic environment, wherein the objective concerns minimization over the shadow prices
of non-traded or partially traded uncertainty. Adequately minimizing the dual recovers the
true market, couples via the cone the set of shadow prices to feasible and optimal decision
rules, and ensures persistence of strong duality.1 Despite that, the resultant shadow prices
ordinarily outline backward-forward equations that do not permit analytical recovery of
their solutions, making the call for approximation rampant.
In view of the notion that the inexistence of closed-form solutions to the optimal trading
rules and consumption behaviour stems entirely from the backward-forward equations
identifying the shadow prices, we confine the set of attainable dual controls to a tractable
parametric family: deterministically constant or affine in the uncertainty, to name a few.
Under this stricture regarding the set to which the shadow prices ought to conform, we
are able to derive definite expressions for the controls that minimize the dual. Thereon,
the analytical dual value function prompts an upper bound on the true one, on account of
strong duality. The magnitude of the bound’s deviation from the optimal value depends
on the quality of the approximation inherent in the restriction of the set of feasible
dual controls. In parallel, the approximate sub-optimal shadow prices give rise via the
barrier cone to continuous consumption streams and investment behaviour that do not by
definition comply with the trading constraints in the baseline financial market.
So as to obtain portfolio decisions that are admissible in the true economic environment,
we turn to the primal side of the problem specification, and propose a construct for a
candidate solution. In particular, the absence of arbitrage empowers us to express the
wealth and consumption processes under some equivalent measure as local martingales,
see Harrison and Kreps (1979), Harrison and Pliska (1981) and Cox and Huang (1989).
Consequently, by the Martingale Representation Theorem (MRT), we are able to gather the
1See Proposition 11.4 in Karatzas et al. (1991a) or Proposition 12.1 in Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992).
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optimal allocation of resources. The Clark-Ocone formula allows us under mild regularity
conditions to explicitly identify the integrand in the MRT as a previsible projection of a
generalised Fréchet derivative in the Wiener-direction, cf. Karatzas et al. (1991b), Ocone
and Karatzas (1991), Nualart (2006), and Di Nunno et al. (2009). Dependent on the
delimitation of the set of shadow prices, the subsequently following dynamic allocation
concurs up to the market prices with the infeasible one emerging from the dual side.
We then project under a case-specific metric the portfolio decisions to the admissible
region, whereby we retrieve closed-form approximations to the true strategies. Numerical
maximization over the therein incorporated shadow prices yields the approximate analytical
portfolio and engenders a lower bound on the optimal value function.2
The discrepancy between the lower and upper bounds arising from the primal and dual
problems is the optimality gap and aids in quantifying the precision of the approximation.
Concretely, this utilatirain difference translates itself into an annual welfare loss that grows
with the level of inaccruacy of the approximation. In order to illustrate the authenticity of
the technique, we cast the problem into Brennan and Xia (2002)’s incomplete economy (e.g.
Battocchio and Menoncin (2004), Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005), Cairns et al. (2006),
Munk (2007), De Jong (2008a) and De Jong (2008b) supply resembling economies), which
accommodates unspanned inflation risk and inhabits a finite-horizon investor. Herein,
we design and introduce the dual CRRA preference qualification, which describes the
investor’s utility. Thereby, we enlarge the framework to one that applies to state-dependent
preferences. Resulting duality gaps and welfare losses are negligibly small.
The attributes that differentiate this study from the existing literature on approximate
methods, e.g. Cvitanić et al. (2003), Detemple et al. (2003) Brandt et al. (2005), Keppo
et al. (2007), and Koijen et al. (2009), which prominently employ the duality bounds and
convex analysis in evaluating these, cf. Haugh et al. (2006), Brown et al. (2010), Brown
and Smith (2011), Bick et al. (2013), and Ma et al. (2017) are threefold: (i) the inclusion
of state-dependent preference qualifications, (ii) , the applicability in a set of markets
that may comprise non-Markovian return dynamics, and (iii) the incorporation of general
trading restrictions. Methodologically, Bick et al. (2013) come closest to our method of
approximation. Their study involves a CRRA agent in a Markovian model, who receives
labour income. Ignoring this endowment, we extend their mode by making it applicable
outside of CRRA stipulations in markets that go beyond Markovian conditions.
2 Model Setup
This section introduces the economic setting by close analogy with the models in Brennan
and Xia (2002) and Detemple and Rindisbacher (2009). In the spirit of Cvitanić and
2We demonstrate that the numerical routine is redundant: one may insert the approximate closed-form
controls implicit in the dual into the fully analytical projected primal controls for identical performance.
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Karatzas (1992), we generalise their economy with inclusion of trading constraints.
2.1 Financial Market Model
Define a horizon T > 0, and consider a probability space (Ω,Ft, {Ft}t∈[0,T ] ,P), whereon
an Rd+m-valued independent standard Brownian motion, {Wt}t∈[0,T ] = {W 1t ,W 2t }t∈[0,T ],
exists: W 1t is Rd-valued. We split Wt to lighten later derivations. The P-augmentation
of Wt’s canonical filtration
{FWt }t∈[0,T ] reads {Ft}t∈[0,T ].3 In the sequel, (in)equalities
between stochastic processes are understood in a P-almost sure sense.
The financial environment, say M, distinguishes a real and a nominal market and
therefore includes a commodity price index, Πt, that harbours both W 1t and W 2t as
dΠt = Πt
[
pitdt+ ξ
Π1
t
>
dW 1t + ξ
Π2
t
>
dW 2t
]
, Π0 = 1. (2.1)
Here, the Ft-measurable pit denotes the rate of inflation. Moreover, ξΠit is FW1t -measurable
for i = 1, 2. We assume that all three processes are in D1,2 ([0, T ]), see Nualart (2006).
Multiplying any asset with the reciprocal of Πt spawns its nominal value. Thereon,
dMt = Mt
[
−rtdt+ φM1t >dW 1t + φM2t
>
dW 2t
]
, M0 = 1 (2.2)
characterizes the real pricing kernel, where rt defines the Ft-measurable real interest rate,
φM1t is FW1t -measurable, and φM2t is Ft-measurable. Suppose that Lt is some traded process,
then
{
LtΠ
−1
t Mt
}
t∈[0,T ] must by construction be a P-martingale.
As a consequence, the nominal state price density (SPD) process complies with
dZt = Zt
[(−rt − pit + λ>1,tξΠ1t + λ>2,tξΠ2t ) dt− λ>1,tdW 1t − λ>2,tdW 2t ] , (2.3)
in which λi,t = ξΠit − φMit , i = 1, 2, delineate the nominal market prices of risk, and where
we let Zt := Π−1t Mt. We postulate that rt ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ]) and φ̂t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])d+m given
that φ̂t :=
[
φM1t , φ
M2
t
]>, securing Malliavin-differentiability of λi,t, for i = 1, 2. Novikov’s
condition, cf. Sec 3.5.D in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), thereby holds. From (2.3),
Rf,t = rt + pit − λ>1,tξΠ1t − λ>2,tξΠ2t (2.4)
retains, signifying the identity for the instantaneous nominal interest rate.
The economic model accommodates an instantaneously risk-free asset, i.e. a money
market account, and d+m non-dividend paying risky assets that evolve pursuant to
dSt
St
=
(
Rf,t1d+m + σ
S1
t λ1,t + σ
S2
t λ2,t
)
dt+ σS1t dW
1
t + σ
S2
t dW
2
t , S0 = 1d+m, (2.5)
3Identify the Wiener space: Ω = C0
(
[0, T ] ;Rd
)×C0 ([0, T ] ;Rm), F = BdT ⊗BmT , P (dW ) = P (dW 1)⊗
P
(
dW 2
)
, cf. Detemple and Rindisbacher (2005); FWit is the P-augmented filtration of W it ’s, i = 1, 2.
3
where diag
(
σSit σ
Si
t
>) ∈ L1 ([0, T ])d+m for Ft-measurable volatility matrices σSit that fulfill
the strong non-degeneracy assumption ψ>σSit σ
Si
t
>
ψ ≥ i‖ψ‖Rd+m for all φ ∈ Rd+m, some
i ∈ R+, i = 1, 2. The foregoing assumption assures invertibility of
[
σS1t , σ
S2
t
]
. Further,
dBt = Rf,tBtdt, B0 = 1, (2.6)
details the cash account. This construction relies on those in Brennan and Xia (2002) and
Detemple and Rindisbacher (2009). Modifications of the trading restrictions pertaining to
St authorize us to control {Wt}t∈[0,T ]’s degree of diversifibability.
The wealth process in agreement with that of some finite-horizon investor obeys
dXt = Xt
[(
Rf,t + x
>
t σ̂tλ̂t
)
dt+ x>t σ̂tdWt
]
− ctdt, X0 ∈ R+, (2.7)
for an initial endowment X0, where ct denotes the progressively Ft-measurable consumption
process, and xt the Rd+m-valued progressively Ft-measurable fraction of Xt allocated to
St. Moreover, we define σ̂t :=
[
σS1t , σ
S2
t
]
and λ̂t := [λ1,t, λ2,t]
>. Note that the investor
determines {xt, ct}t∈[0,T ] in order to maximize an expected utility criterion. We call a pair
{xt, ct}t∈[0,T ] admissible if in addition to Xt ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], it fulfills
x>t σ̂tσ̂
>
t xt ∈ L1 ([0, T ]) ,
∣∣∣x>t σ̂tλ̂t∣∣∣ ∈ L1 ([0, T ]) , and ct ∈ L2 (Ω× [0, T ]) . (2.8)
We denote the class of all such admissible trading-consumption pairs by AX0 .
Ultimately, suppose that K ⊆ Rd+m describes a non-empty closed and convex set that
comprises the investment constraints imposed on xt in a dt⊗ P-a.e. sense. Accordingly,
let us define ÂX0 as the set of all {xt, ct}t∈[0,T ] ∈ AX0 such that xt ∈ K holds dt⊗ P-a.e.
We remark that all the exploited spaces conform to their conventional definitions.4
2.2 Fictitious Completion Assets
Assume that the market in section 2.1 is constrained concerning admissibility of {xt}t∈[0,T ]
via K ⊆ Rd+m such that {xt, ct}t∈[0,T ] ∈ ÂX0 . Appealing to the results in contributions by
He and Pearson (1991), Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992), and Schroder and Skiadas (2003)
we may complete the baseline market by instituting so-called fictitious assets.
To that end, we introduce respectively K’s support function and the barrier cone:
δ (ν̂t) := sup
{xt}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
(−ν̂>t xt) , and A˜X0 := {ν̂t | δ (ν̂t) <∞} (2.9)
for all Ft-measurable endogenous shadow prices ν̂t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])d+m, where δ : Rd+m →
R∪{∞}, and Â′X0 represents the set containing all {xt}t∈[0,T ] that cohere with {xt, ct}t∈[0,T ] ∈
4In fact, Lp ([0, T ]) is the Lebesgue space of all P-a.s. p-integrable stochastic processes, p ≥ 0.
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ÂX0 , i.e. all {xt}t∈[0,T ] meeting (2.8) for which xt ∈ K is true dt⊗ P-a.e.. We postulate
that K contains the origin, and additionally define HÂ :=
{
ν̂t | ‖δ (ν̂t)‖L2(Ω×[0,T ]) <∞
}
given ν̂t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])d+m. Notice that ν̂t ∈ HÂ implies that ν̂t ∈ A˜X0 .
For any ν̂t ∈ HÂ, we fictitiously complete the asset menu constituting the unconstrained
artificial market. For that purpose, introduce the fictitious analogues of Bt and St:
dB̂t = [Rf,t + δ (ν̂t)] B̂tdt, B̂0 = 1,
dŜt/Ŝt =
((
Rf,t + δ (ν̂t)
)
1d+m + σ̂t
(
λ̂t + σ̂
−1
t ν̂t
))
dt+ σ̂tdWt, Ŝ0 = 1d+m.
(2.10)
In this artificial model, say Mν̂ , the nominal interest rate reads Rf,t + δ (ν̂t), and the
risk-premium on the d+m-dimensional synthetic risky assets Ŝt changes into σ̂t
(
λ̂t+σ̂
−1
t ν̂t
)
.
All assumptions as to the baseline stock St in (2.5) remain in force here.
Let E (·) be the so-called Doléans-Dade exponential. The system of equations for B̂t
and Ŝt alludes to anMν̂-specific stochastic deflator process that obeys to
Z ν̂T = ZTE
([
σ̂−1t ν̂t
]>)
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(
δ (ν̂t) + λ̂
>
t σ̂
−1
t ν̂t
)
dt
)
, (2.11)
where we separate the exogenous ZT from the endogeneity driven by the unspecified
ν̂t. Clearly, the market prices of risk inMν̂ abide by λ̂t + σ̂−1t ν̂t. Correspondingly, Z ν̂T
segregates into B̂−1T dQ
ν̂/dP, where Qν̂ ∼ P defines the non-unique pricing measure. For
this reason, dWQ
ν̂
t = dWt +
(
λ̂t + σ̂
−1
t ν̂t
)
dt characterizes a Qν̂-standard Brownian motion.
The non-unicity of ν̂t thus signifies its ability to perturb the pricing measure Qν̂ and the
affiliated economic scenarios alongside the stocks’ risk premia.5
The dynamic wealth process for finite-horizon investors living inMν̂ ensues as
dX ν̂t = X
ν̂
t
[(
Rf,t + δ
(
ν̂t
)
+ x̂>t σ̂t
(
λ̂t + σ̂
−1
t ν̂t
))
dt+ x̂>t σ̂tdWt
]
− ĉtdt (2.12)
in which x̂t denotes the Rd+m-valued progressively Ft-measurable proportion ofX ν̂t invested
in Ŝt, ĉt the progressively Ft-measurable consumption control, and X ν̂0 = X0 ∈ R+ the
initial endowment. Analogously, the individual selects {x̂t, ĉt}t∈[0,T ] in an attempt to
maximize expected (life-time) utility. Thereby, we invoke the following assumptions
x̂>t σ̂tσ̂
>
t x̂t,
∣∣∣x̂>t σ̂tλ̂t∣∣∣ ∈ L1 ([0, T ]) , and ĉt ∈ L2 (Ω× [0, T ]) . (2.13)
In the market modelMν̂ , a pair {x̂t, ĉt}t∈[0,T ] is admissible if apart from (2.13), it secures
X ν̂t ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Let us denote the class of admissible trading-consumption pairs
by Âν̂X0 . Admissibility inMν̂ is in general not equivalent to that in the (un)constrained
baseline financial market: B̂t, Ŝt differ from Bt, St and K does not act upon Âν̂X0 .
5For δ (ν̂t) 6= 0 dt⊗ P-a.e. ν̂t might also affect theMν̂ ’s interest rate. In the presence of non-traded
risk, the latter turns into an equality, consider for instance Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) or Tepla (2000).
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In consideration of the aforementioned disparity, we derive that the discrepancy
between artificial and true wealth equals dX ν̂t − dXt =
(
δ (ν̂t) + x̂
>
t ν̂t
)
dt ≥ 0 for all
{x̂, ĉt}t∈[0,T ] ∈ ÂX0 ⊂ Âν̂X0 such that X ν̂t ≥ Xt ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] given that x̂t = xt and ĉt = ct.6
Intuitively, under these premises, a consequence is thatMν̂ reduces toM under
{x̂t}t∈[0,T ] ∈ Â′X0 , and δ (ν̂t) + x̂>t ν̂t = 0, (2.14)
and contemporaneously leads to optimality in the baseline environment, see Prop. 8.3 in
Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992). ProcuringM fromMν̂ accords with choosing ν̂t ∈ HÂ in
an effort to realise (2.14). In the sequel, we mathematically explicate this construction.
2.3 Preferences Finite-horizon Investor
The baseline environment M entertains some finite-horizon investor who disposes of
X0 ∈ R+ at t = 0 and retires at t = T . All through [0, T ], the agent seeks to maximize
expected lifetime utility from consumption and expected utility from terminal wealth by
holding a continuously rebalanced portfolio. Thereby, the individual solves
sup
{xt,ct}t∈[0,T ]∈ÂX0
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu (ct,Πt) dt+ U (XT ,ΠT )
]
s.t. dXt = −ctdt+Xt
[(
Rf,t + x
>
t σ̂tλ̂t
)
dt+ x>t σ̂tdWt
]
,
(2.15)
for a deterministic process {βt}t∈[0,T ] denoting the investor’s time-preference, as well as
two utility functions u : R+ ×R+ → R+ and U : R+ ×R+ → R+ that both incorporate
the exogenous commodity price process {Πt}t∈[0,T ] as a benchmark.
Consider U . We assume that the U is once continuously differentiable, U ∈ C1 (R+;R),
in the XT -direction. More, it satisfies the subsequent limiting Inada’s conditions
lim
x→∞
U ′X (x, ·) = 0, and lim
x→0
U ′X (x, ·) =∞, (2.16)
wherein we let U ′X and U ′′XX denote respectively the first and second derivatives of U in
the XT -direction. In particular, we postulate U ′X > 0 and U ′′XX < 0. Additionally,
AE (U) = lim sup
x→0
x
U ′X (x, y)
U (x, y)
< 1, (2.17)
outlines for any y ∈ R+ the reasonable asymptotic elasticity condition in Kramkov and
Schachermayer (1999). We impose this condition to hold in order to i.a. assure existence
of optimal solutions, feasibility of duality modes and finiteness of expectations.
6We endow the fictitious controls with the hat-notation so as to concretize the difference between the
baseline and fictitious environments. In Haugh et al. (2006), x̂t = xt and ĉt = ct is set a priori. Let us
remark here that X ν̂t Zt +
∫ t
0
csZsds is a P-martingale with respect to Ft if and only if δ (ν̂t) + x̂>t ν̂t = 0.
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The inverse of U ′X in the XT -direction tallies with I : R+ × R+ → R such that
U ′X (I (x, y) , y) = x for all y ∈ R+. We mandate that I and U ′ are piecewise continuously
differentiable, I, U ′ ∈ PC (R+;R), in both directions of XT and ΠT .7 Then, define
V (x, y) = sup
z>0
(U (z, y)− xz) = U (I (x, y) , y)− xI (x, y) (2.18)
for x, y ∈ R+ as the convex conjugate of U , which is likewise in PC (R+;R). Ultimately,
we suppose that U ′Y < 0, where U ′Y is U ’s first derivative in the ΠT -direction
Regarding u, we enforce the same assumptions as on U . Moreover, u′X and u′′XX denote
the first and second derivatives of u in the first argument; u′Y is u’s first derivative in the
Πt-direction. Let I˜ : R+ ×R+ → R be the inverse of u′X in the ct-direction. Thence,
v (x, y) = e−
∫ t
0 βsu
(
I˜
(
e
∫ t
0 βsx, y
)
, y
)− xI˜(e∫ t0 βsx, y) (2.19)
demarcates the convex conjugate of e−
∫ t
0 βsu, resulting from supz∈R+
(
e−
∫ t
0 βsu (z, y)− xz),
for x, y ∈ R+. We explicitly embed the price index into both utility specifications in the
light of motives that relate to real wealth, cf. Brennan and Xia (2002). Note that Πt is
sufficiently general; applications including R+-valued semi-martingales are trivial.
3 Portfolio Choice
We advance by probing (2.15). Herein, we classify the problem into two cooperating ones
according to the unconstrained market and the therein entrenched true economy. In order
to envision the implications of convex duality, we first solve the portfolio choice problem
in this unconstrained model. Afterwards, we activate the trading restrictions and apply
martingale duality to recover the portfolio composition in its constrained counterpart. We
finalize by clarifying the ramifications of the duality concepts for non-traded risk.
3.1 Allocation Unconstrained Market
We first explore (2.15) in the unconstrained marketM. Drawing on the martingale method,
cf. Pliska (1986), Karatzas et al. (1987), and Cox and Huang (1989, 1991), we transform
the dynamic problem in (2.15) into a static variational formulation as specified by
sup
(XT ,ct)∈L̂2
E
[∫ T
0
u (ct,Πt)
e
∫ t
0 βsds
dt+ U (XT ,ΠT )
]
s.t. E
[∫ T
0
ctZtdt +XTZT
]
≤ X0, (3.1)
which is identical to the aforementioned dynamic stochastic optimal control problem,
where L̂2 := L2 (Ω)× L2 (Ω× [0, T ]) and {Zt}t∈[0,T ] lives by the nominal SPD in (2.3).
7This description is in the mould of Detemple and Zapatero (1991), whose generality we enlarge by
relying on Lakner and Nygren (2006) to retain that I (F,G) ∈ D1,2 for F,G ∈ D1,2, I ∈ PC (R+;R).
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In this reformulated static problem, the agent maximizes expected utility over all
attainable or equitably admissible contingent claims that involve a continuous stream
of coupon payments. Hereinafter, arbitrage arguments inclusive of the self-financing
condition implicit in (2.7) facilitate us to recover {xt}t∈[0,T ], which hedges the investor
against adverse shifts in the “underlyings” of XT and {ct}t∈[0,T ]. In particular, denote by
DWt the Malliavin derivative in the Wt-direction, then Theorem A.1 states that
XTZT +
∫ T
0
ctZtdt = X0 +
∫ T
0
E
[
DWt
(
XTZT +
∫ T
0
csZsds
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]> dWt. (3.2)
Further, the budget constraint in (3.1) ensures that {Xt}t∈[0,T ] remains self-financing.
The martingale modes that we exploit in solving (3.1) authorize us to circumvent the
typical abridgement of the generality due to the assumption of a Markovian return structure
in the financial model.8 By virtue of the static nature of the problem in (3.1), we are then
able to resort to Lagrangian technology on infinite-dimensional Banach spaces in order
to rescue optimal horizon wealth, consumption patterns, and the harmonious portfolio
decomposition. Theorem 3.1 embraces the ensuing optimal solutions to (3.1).
Theorem 3.1. Consider the portfolio choice problem (3.1) in the unconstrained market,
for an investor with wealth dynamics (2.7). Then, optimal ct and XT materialize into
coptt = I˜
(
e
∫ t
0 βsH−1 (X0)Zt,Πt
)
, and XoptT = I
(H−1 (X0)ZT ,ΠT ) , (3.3)
where Xoptt = E
[
XTZt,T +
∫ T
t
csZt,sds
∣∣ Ft] and Zt,T := Z−1t ZT , for t ∈ [0, T ]. Additionally,
H−1 (X0) characterizes the multiplier, given the decreasing function H : R+ → R+
H (η) = E
[∫ T
0
I˜ (ηZt,Πt)Ztdt+ I (ηZT ,ΠT )ZT
]
= X0, η ∈ R+ (3.4)
in which X0 ∈ R+ represents the fixed initial endowment: the budget constraint binds. The
congruent optimal portfolio rules originate from the following identity
xoptt =
σ̂>
−1
t
Xoptt
(
x˜m,optt λ̂t + E
[
Z−1t
(∫ T
t
R1−1c,uG1t,udu+R1−1X G1t,T
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]
+ E
[∫ T
t
(
1−R2−1c,u
)
G2t,ucoptu Zt,udu+
(
1−R2−1X
)
G2t,TXoptT Zt,T
∣∣∣∣ Ft]
)
,
(3.5)
which is extricable by virtue of the MRT and uniqueness of the integrand in (3.2).
Proof. Define L(XT , {ct} , η) = E[ ∫ T0 e− ∫ t0 βsu(ct,Πt)+U(XT ,ΠT )−η( ∫ T0 ctZtdt+XTZ λ̂2T −
8Replicating arguments namely consolidate through the MRT and Clark-Ocone formula that do not
enjoin Markovian dynamics. Moreover, U and u satisfy minimal conditions and are state-dependent due
to the incorporated {Πt}t∈[0,T ]. Both aspects considerably enlarge the generality in Bick et al. (2013).
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X0
)]
as the Lagrangian, for some η ∈ R+. Then, L : L2 (Ω)× L2 (Ω× [0, T ])×R+ → R.
Therefrom, let ξ1 ∈ L2 (Ω), ξ2 ∈ L2 (Ω× [0, T ]) along with ξ3 ∈ R+. We derive
DXTL (XT , {ct} , η) ξ1 =
〈
U ′X (XT ,ΠT )− ηZT , ξ1
〉
L2(Ω)
= 0,
D{ct}L (XT , {ct} , η) {ξ2} =
〈
e−
∫ t
0 βsu′X (ct,Πt)− ηZt, ξ2
〉
L2(Ω×[0,T ])
= 0,
(3.6)
and DηL (XT , {ct} , η) ξ3 =
〈
XTZT +
∫ T
0
ctZtdt−X0, ξ3
〉
L2(Ω)
= 0, where DXTL : L2 (Ω)→
R, D{ct}L : L2 (Ω× [0, T ])→ R, and DηL : R+ → R, cf. Definition A.1.9 Hence,
U ′X (XT ,ΠT )− ηZT = 0, and e−
∫ t
0 βsu′X (ct,Πt)− ηZt = 0. (3.7)
Note that DXT ,XTL{ξ1, ξ1} = 〈U ′′XX (XT ,ΠT ) , ξ21〉L2(Ω) < 0 and D{ct},{ct}L{ξ2, ξ2} =〈
e−
∫ t
0 βsu′′{ct},{ct} (ct,Πt) , ξ
2
2
〉
L2(Ω×[0,T ])
< 0 ∀ ξ ∈ L2 (Ω), ξ2 ∈ L2 (Ω× [0, T ]) or
E [U (XT ,ΠT )] ≤ E [V (ηZT ,ΠT ) + ηZTXT ]
= E [U (I (ηZT ,ΠT ) ,ΠT )− η (I (ηZT ,ΠT )ZT +XTZT )]
≤ E [U (I (H−1 (X0)ZT ,ΠT ) ,ΠT )] = E [U (XoptT ,ΠT )] ,
(3.8)
and analogously E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu (ct,Πt)
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu
(
coptt ,Πt
)] ∀ (XT , ct) ∈ L̂2,
which verifies optimality of the pair
(
XoptT , c
opt
t
)
inherent in (3.7).
Let us then advance by deriving the optimal portfolio rules. From the MRT,
((
x>t σ̂t − λ̂>t
)
Xoptt Zt
)>
= E
[
DWt
(
XoptT ZT +
∫ T
t
copts Zsds
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] (3.9)
must hold, because XoptT Z
λ2
T +
∫ T
0
coptt Ztdt ∈ D1,2 ⊂ L2 (Ω) is a P-martingale. Define
G1t,u :=
∫ u
t
(
DWt pis −DWt ξ̂s · ξ̂s
)
ds+
∫ u
t
DWt ξ̂sdWs + ξ̂t, u ≥ t
G2t,u := −
∫ u
t
DWt
(
Rf,s +DWt λ̂s · λ̂s
)
ds−
∫ u
t
DWt λ̂sdWs, u ≥ t,
(3.10)
for DWt Rf,s = DWt rs + DWt pis − DWt ξ̂>t λ̂t, with R2−1c,u = −u′X (coptu ,Πu)/u′′XX (coptu ,Πu) 1coptu ,
R2−1X = −U ′X
(
XoptT ,ΠT
)
/U ′′XX
(
XoptT ,ΠT
)
XoptT
−1. The optimal xoptt emerge given
x˜m,optt = E
[(∫ T
t
R2−1c,ucoptu Zt,udu+R2−1X XoptT Zt,T
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] (3.11)
with R1−1c,u = I˜ ′Y
(
e
∫ u
0 βsdsH−1 (X0)Zu,Πu
)
Mu and R1−1X = I ′Y
(H−1 (X0)ZT ,ΠT )MT .
9Here, DXTL is bounded linear given that ‖U ′X (XT ,ΠT ) ‖L2(Ω) <∞ holds. Any XT = I (WT ,ΠT ) for
some WT ∈ L2 (Ω) satisfies this condition; XoptT ∈ L2 (Ω) hence obeys. This carries over to u′X (ct,Πt).
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Descrying the unconstrained M as the true economy, we break down Theorem 3.1.
To erase the semblance of superfluity concerning the formulae in (3.3), we note that this
theorem sheds light on the solution technique embroiling infinite-dimensional optimization.
In applications of convex duality, this technique plays a prominent role. The formulae
themselves constitute celebrated identities to which a copious strand of the literature has
supplied economically intuitive implications; consider e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1998).
The expression for xoptt germinates after deriving
{
Xoptt , c
opt
t
}
t∈[0,T ] from uniqueness of the
integrand in (3.2), which dictates given X optt,T := B−1T XoptT +
∫ T
t
B−1u c
opt
u du that10
xoptt =
(
B−1t X
opt
t σ̂
>
t
)
EQ
[
DWt X optt,T −X opt0,T
∫ T
t
DWt λ̂sdWQs
∣∣∣∣ Ft] . (3.12)
In specific, xoptt encases three distinct portfolio decisions that unfold themselves by com-
putations along the lines of the decomposition manoeuvres in Detemple and Rindisbacher
(2009). The separation of these hedging demands submits to xoptt = xmt +xZt +xΠt , where the
first rule concerns the tangency mean-variance efficient portfolio xmt = X
opt
t
−1
x˜m,optt σ̂
>−1
t λ̂t.
See Merton (1969) for like weights in line with CRRA preferences. The remaining two
demands are respectively price index and nominal deflator hedges that answer to
xΠ,opt = σ̂>
−1
t X
opt
t
−1
E
[∫ T
t
R1−1c,uG1t,uZ−1t du+R1−1X G1t,TZ−1t
∣∣∣∣ Ft]
xZ,opt =
σ̂>
−1
t
Xoptt
E
[∫ T
t
(
1−R2−1c,u
)
G2t,u c
opt
u
Zu,t
du+
(
1−R2−1X
)
G2t,TX
opt
T
ZT,t
∣∣∣∣ Ft] . (3.13)
The expressions in (3.10) provoke the hedging coefficients within these portfolio weights,
whereas the “R” terms are interdependent with quantities that categorize relative risk-
aversion (RRA). By partitioning the former identities into subgroups that share the same
intrinsic character, we could disentangle more specific hedging motivations such as shadow
price hedges or interest rate hedges, cf. Detemple (2014) for akin rules.
As concerns the RRA factors, let us exemplify the matter for a ratio CRRA agent whose
preferences obey U (x, y) = (1− γ)−1 ((x/y)1−γ − 1) for x, y ∈ R+, γ > 1. Consequently,
− U
′
X
(
XoptT ,ΠT
)
U ′′XX
(
XoptT ,ΠT
)XoptT −1 = 1γ , and I ′Y (ηoptZT ,ΠT ) MTXoptT =
(
1− 1
γ
)
ZT , (3.14)
where ηopt := H−1 (X0), which infers that R1−1X = (1− 1/γ)XoptT ZT and R2−1X = 1/γ.
Presuming that utility from consumption respects an identical qualification, we straight-
forwardly find that R1−1c,u = (1− 1/γ) coptu Zu and R2−1c,u = 1/γ. In both instances, we
10We employ the fact that ZT = B−1T
dQ
dP for a unique equivalent martingale measure Q ∼ P, whence
dWQt = dWt + λ̂tdt is the stochastic differential equation for a standard Brownian motion under Q. The
displayed equality thus disentangles and explicates the effect of the pricing measure Q on xoptt .
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observe the similarities between the RRA structures, R1−1X =
(
1 − R2−1X
)
XoptT ZT and
R1−1c,u =
(
1 − R2−1c,u
)
coptu Zu. There is no guarantee that this proximity surpasses this
example; we generalise it as part of the demand concomitant inflation risk.
Assuming that U and u are such that R1−1X =
(
1 −R2−1X
)
XoptT ZT and R1−1c,u =
(
1 −
R2−1c,u
)
coptu Zu hold , the optimal portfolio composition x
opt
t in (3.5) transforms into
xoptt =
σ̂>
−1
t
Xoptt
(
E
[(∫ T
t
R2−1c,ucoptu Zt,uλ̂tdu+R2−1X XoptT Zt,T λ̂t
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]
+ E
[∫ T
t
(
1−R2−1c,u
) 2∑
i=1
Git,u c
opt
u
Zu,t
du+
(
1−R2−1X
) 2∑
i=1
Git,TX
opt
T
ZT,t
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
])
,
(3.15)
wherein the two-fund separation principle for ct’s RRA and XT ’s RRA in isolation is
preponderantly visible. Namely, we distinguish the two mutual funds on the basis of the
the detached RRA fractions: R1−1c,u and 1−R2−1c,u with respect to coptt , R2−1X and 1−R2−1X
regarding XoptT . The requirements imposed on u and U under which the separation precept
holds apply for instance to dual CRRA stipulations. In Brennan and Xia (2002), the
authors unravel this phenomenon in detail for a utility-maximizing CRRA investor.11
3.2 Application Convex Duality
This section applies convex martingale duality to the dynamic asset allocation problem in
M, wherein we constrain {xt}t∈[0,T ] to Â′X0 . We assemble the duality techniques in a style
that is to a great extent inspired by Rogers (2001), for the sake of merging the primal
with the dual. We relegate explicit optimality statements to the next section.
Now, consider an agent in the baseline economic environmentM from section 2.1, whose
wealth dynamics accommodate general investment restrictions through K. Therefore,
sup
{xt,ct}t∈[0,T ]∈ÂX0
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu (ct,Πt) dt+ U (XT ,ΠT )
]
s.t. dXt = −ctdt+Xt
[(
Rf,t + x
>
t σ̂tλ̂t
)
dt+ x>t σ̂tdWt
]
,
(3.16)
for given X0 ∈ R+ details the constrained portfolio choice problem. The martingale
method fails to render a static problem tantamount to (3.1), due to the presence of these
constraints. Notwithstanding, after applying duality modes, the resulting dual implies the
fictitious marketMν̂ , in which a static unconstrained problem surfaces.
For purposes that facilitate applications of duality, we rework the dynamic constraint:
XTB
−1
T = X0 −
∫ T
0
ctB
−1
t dt+
∫ T
0
XtB
−1
t x
>
t σ̂t
(
dWt + λ̂tdt
)
(3.17)
11The concepts underscoring the solutions/techniques in the fictitiousMν̂ are of the same kind as those
in the unconstrained baselineM. Comprehending the later is of necessity for the former.
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The exogenous money market account Bt in this numéraire-based approach does not
influence the optimality conditions, cf. the monograph by Rogers (2013). In the wake
of the aforestated study, we then introduce a strictly positive semi-martingale process
{Yt}t∈[0,T ] for some Y0 ∈ R+ that serves as a state-wise Lagrange multiplier on the dynamic
relative wealth equation (3.17) in the constrained portfolio problem. Forasmuch as clarity
regarding this procedure, let dYt = Yt
[
αY,tdt+ β̂tdWt
]
. Then, E[XTB−1T YT ] equals
X0Y0 +
〈
B−1t Yt,
(
x>t σ̂t
(
λ̂t + β̂t
)
+ αY,t
)
Xt − ct
〉
L2(Ω×[0,T ])
, (3.18)
in consideration of integration by parts results, where the square-integrable stochastic
integral
∫ T
0
(
β̂>t + x
>
t σ̂t
)
dWt vanishes in expectation. In formulating the Lagrangian
consonant with (3.16), we may embed the surrogate constraint in (3.18). Complementary
slackness (CS) then poses restrictions on the drift and diffusion coefficients of Yt. The
dual problem in turn transpires and involves minimization over {Yt}t∈[0,T ].12
Alternatively, we could enforce YT on the rewritten dynamic constraint (3.17) as a
Lagrange multiplier in the ordinary fashion. Therewith, we arrive in expectation at〈
YT , δ
(
x>t σ̂tλ̂tXtB
−1
t
)
+X0
〉
L2(Ω)
+
〈
YTB
−1
t ,−ct + x>t σ̂tλ̂tXt
〉
L2(Ω×[0,T ])
, (3.19)
which we may rework by Skorokhod’s duality result, cf. Theorem A.2. According to this the-
orem, we obtain E
[
YT
∫ T
0
XtB
−1
t x
>
t σ̂tdWt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
XtB
−1
t x
>
t σ̂tE[YTDWt log(YT )
∣∣ Ft]dt],
reliant on the Hermitian adjoint operator of the Malliavin kernel. This approach is ef-
fectively identical to the techniques applied in Rogers (2001) as well as in (3.18), and
emphasizes the integration by parts recipe. Let us then turn to the duality results based
on this Lagrange multiplier procedure, as subsequently set out in Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the constrained dynamic allocation problem in (3.16). Introduce
dYt = Yt
[
αY,tdt+ β
>
1,tdW
1
t + β
>
2,tdW
2
t
]
, (3.20)
for some unspecified Y0 ∈ R+, where ‖β1,t‖L1([0,T ])d , ‖β2,t‖L1([0,T ])m ∈ D1,2. Moreover, let
β̂t = [β1,t, β2,t]
> and define the drift term αY,t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ]) comprised within Yt as
−αY,t = δ
(
β̂t
)
:= sup
{xt}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
((
λ̂t+β̂t
)>
σ̂tx̂t
)
, & A˜PX0 :=
{
β̂t | δ
(
β̂t
)
<∞
}
. (3.21)
Let HPÂ :=
{
β̂t | ‖δ(β̂t)1/2‖2L2(Ω×[0,T ]) <∞
}
and n = m+ d, the dual then adheres to
inf
β̂t∈D1,2([0,T ])n,Y0∈R+
E
[∫ T
0
v
(
YtB
−1
t ,Πt
)
dt+ V
(
YTB
−1
T ,ΠT
)]
+X0Y0 s.t. β̂t ∈ HPÂ, (3.22)
12In the posterior Theorem 3.2, the semi-martingale Yt finds its technically precise definition. Observe
that if we pursue along these lines in the unconstrained environmentM, we obtain Yt = dQdP
∣∣
FtH−1 (X0).
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where v, V : R+×R+ → R denote the convex conjugates of e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu and U . Suppose that
β̂optt solves (3.22) and δ
(
β̂optt
)
=
(
λ̂t + β̂
opt
t
)>
σ̂tx
opt
t . Optimal XT and ct then conform to
coptt = I˜
(
e
∫ t
0 βsdsY optt B
−1
t ,Πt
)
and XoptT = I
(
Y optT B
−1
T ,ΠT
)
, (3.23)
in which the optimal Lagrange multiplier is obtainable from the next equality
Ĥ (Y opt0 ) = Y opt0 −1E [∫ T
0
coptt
Y optt
Bt
dt+XoptT
Y optT
BT
]
= X0 (3.24)
such that Y opt0 = Ĥ−1 (X0). The homogeneous optimal portfolio decisions xoptt thence
decompose into x̂m,optt + x̂
Z,opt
t + x̂
Π,opt
t , for x̂
m,opt
t = − 1R̂f,1,tX
opt
t
−1
σ̂>
−1
t β̂
opt
t including
x̂Π,opt =
σ̂>
−1
t
Xoptt
E
[∫ T
t
R̂1−1c,uĜ1t,uBtY optt −1du+ R̂1
−1
X Ĝ1t,TBtY −1t opt
∣∣∣∣ Ft]
x̂Z,opt = σ̂>
−1
t E
[∫ T
t
(
Ĝ2t,u − Ĝ
2
t,u
R̂2c,u
)
c¨optt,u
Xoptt
du+
(
Ĝ2t,T − Ĝ
2
t,T
R̂2X
)
X¨optt,T
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
] (3.25)
where R̂−1f,t,T = −E
[( ∫ T
t
R̂2−1c,ucoptu Y
opt
t,u
Bt,u
du + R̂2−1X XoptT
Y optt,T
Bt,T
) ∣∣∣ Ft], c¨optt,u = coptu Y optt,uBt,u , X¨optt,T =
1
Xoptt
XoptT
Y optt,T
Bt,T
. Lastly, Xoptt = E
[ ∫ T
t
coptu
Y optt,u
Bt,u
du+XoptT
Y optt,T
Bt,T
∣∣∣ Ft], and the subsequent
sup
{xt}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
∫ T
0
(
E
[
ŜTYTBT
−1
∣∣∣ Ft]− E [YT | Ft]StBt−1)> dXtxt  S−1t <∞. (3.26)
holds, implying that Y −10 B
−1
T YT , induces the SPD in the constrained baseline marketM.
Proof. We follow Klein and Rogers (2007) in applying convexity techniques. In this regard,
let us introduce the Lagrangian for problem (3.16) and rewrite it by Itô’s Lemma:
L = E
[ ∫ T
0
u (ct,Πt)
e
∫ t
0 βsds
dt+ U (XT ,ΠT ) +X0Y0 −XTYTBT−1 −
∫ T
0
ctYtBt
−1dt
+
∫ T
0
{(
x>t σ̂tλ̂t + αY,t + x
>
t σ̂tβt
)
XtYtBt
−1dt+
(
x>t σ̂t + β̂t
)
XtYtBt
−1dWt
}]
.
(3.27)
Minimization in the XT -direction and in the {ct}t∈[0,T ]-direction of L yields13
DXTLζ = E
[(
U ′X (XT ,ΠT )− YTB−1T
)]
ζ = 0
D{ct}L
{
ζ˜t
}
= E
[∫ T
0
(
e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu′X (ct,Πt)− YtB−1t
)
ζ˜tdt
]
= 0,
(3.28)
for all ζ ∈ R+ and ζ˜t ∈ L2 (Ω× [0, T ]), which procure the optimality conditions in (3.23).
13We refer to the proof of Theorem 3.1 for analogous identities (FOC’s) involving Fréchet derivatives
13
Inserting coptt and X
opt
T back into L, we acquire the dual objective function up to
sup
{xt}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
E
[ ∫ T
0
XtYtBt
−1x>t σ̂t
(
λ̂t + αY,t + β̂t
)
dt
]
. (3.29)
after optimizing over {xt}t∈[0,T ] ∈ Â′X0 . CS then engenders (3.21) and (3.26).
Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) show that β̂optt ensures x
opt
t ∈ ÂX0 . By Theorem A.1:(
x>t σ̂t + β̂
>
t
)
Xoptt Yt
optBt
−1 = E
[DWt (XoptT YT optBT−1 + ∫ Tt coptu YuoptBu−1du) ∣∣ Ft]>. Let
Ĝ1t,u :=
∫ u
t
(
DWt pis −DWt ξ̂s · ξ̂s
)
ds+
∫ u
t
DWt ξ̂sdWs + ξ̂t, u ≥ t
Ĝ2t,u := −
∫ u
t
DWt
(
Rf,s + δ
(
β̂t
)
+DWt β̂s · β̂s
)
ds+
∫ u
t
DWt β̂sdWs, u ≥ t,
(3.30)
in which DWt Rf,s for s ≥ t is given in Theorem 3.1. Further, all R̂2 terms are equivalent
to the R2 terms with inclusion of (3.23) rather than (3.3). Accordingly,
xoptt =
σ̂>
−1
t
Xoptt
(
x¨m,optt β̂t +BtY
−1
t E
[∫ T
t
R̂1−1c,uĜ1t,udu+ R̂1
−1
X Ĝ1t,T
∣∣∣∣ Ft]
+ E
[∫ T
t
(
1− R̂2−1c,u
)
Ĝ2t,uc¨optt,u du+
(
1− R̂2−1X
)
Ĝ2t,TXoptT Yt,TBt,T−1
∣∣∣∣ Ft]
) (3.31)
where x¨m,optt = −E
[( ∫ T
t
R̂2−1c,uc¨optu,t du+ R̂2
−1
X X
opt
T
Y optt,T
Bt,T
) ∣∣ Ft], R̂1c,u = I˜ ′Y (e∫ u0 βsds Y optuBu ,Πu)
M̂u, R̂1X = I ′Y
(
Y optT B
−1
T ,ΠT
)
M̂T , in which we define M̂t = B−1t Y
opt
t Πt ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].14
The anterior theorem reveals two paramount facets that lay the groundwork for the
approximate method: (i) the existence of an artificial market, in which by construction the
encapsulated objective function supplies an upper bound on the true value function, and
(ii) the generic FOC’s essential to this artificial market that succeed to ensure optimality
in the constrained baseline M. In the interest of the two aspects, let us turn to a full
elucidation ofMν̂ by conciliating the results in Theorem 3.2 with the conceptualization of
the fictitious market in section 2.2 according to Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992). Apurpose,
parametrize β̂t as β̂t = −λ̂t − σ̂−1t ν̂t for some ν̂t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])d+m. Then, rewrite
−αY,t = δ
(
ν̂t
)
:= sup
{x̂t}t∈[0,T ]∈ÂPX0
(− ν̂>t x̂t), with A˜PX0 := A˜X0 = {ν̂t | δ (ν̂t) <∞}. (3.32)
The drift term αY,t encircled within Yt thus alters into the negative counterpart of the
support function inMν̂ , such that the corresponding barrier cone changes as well into
the analogue of Mν̂ , see (2.9). Similarly, the set of feasible dual controls HPÂ becomes
14Here, Xoptt YtB
−1
t = E
[ ∫ T
t
coptu du+X
opt
T Y
opt
T BT
−1 ∣∣ Ft], for Yt,T := Y −1t YT , Bt,T := B−1t BT . More,
Y opt0 is acquirable similar to H−1 (X0) in Theorem 3.1, and “” denotes the Hadamard product.
14
HÂ, and we require in accordance with the dual constraint (3.22) that ν̂t ∈ HÂ. Let us
then observe that the B−1t Yt term is for all t ∈ [0, T ] separable as Y0B̂−1t dQν̂/dP
∣∣
Ft or
likewise as Y0Z ν̂t , where B̂t is the fictitious money market account, Z ν̂t the artificial SPD,
and Qν̂ the non-unique pricing measure inMν̂ . Therefore, B−1t Yt alludes to a new market,
wherein B̂t serves as money market account and Ŝt in (2.10) as risky asset.15
In the artificial market, the investor is unconstrained with regard to the choice of
portfolio rules {x̂t}t∈[0,T ], effecting that the martingale method is applicable. Hence,
sup
(X ν̂T ,ĉt)∈L̂2
E
[ ∫ T
0
e
∫ t
0 βsdsu (ĉt,Πt) dt+ U
(
X ν̂T ,ΠT
) ]
s.t. E
[ ∫ T
0
ĉtZ
ν̂
t dt+X
ν̂
TZ
ν̂
T
]
≤ X0, for ν̂t ∈ HÂ
(3.33)
characterizes the fictitious static duplicate of the primal problem in (3.16), where X ν̂T is the
terminal value of synthetic wealth in (2.12), {ĉt}t∈[0,T ] the fictitious consumption behaviour,
Z ν̂t equates to Y
−1
0 YtB
−1
t , and ν̂t ∈ HÂ is left unspecified. As a consequence, optimal
fictitious horizon wealth and consumption respectively live by X ν̂,optT = I
(
η̂optZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
and
ĉoptt = I˜
(
η̂opte
∫ t
0 βsdsZ ν̂t ,Πt
)
, where the matching rules x̂optt are equal to x
opt
t in (3.31), and
the Lagrange multiplier η̂opt ∈ R+ is such that the static constraint binds.
Remark 1. Let Lν̂t,T =
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 βsdsu (ĉt,Πt) dt + U
(
X ν̂T ,ΠT
)
, and ην̂ ∈ R+ be such that
the budget constraint (3.33) binds. Then, the specification in (3.22) is identical to
Jopt (X0) = inf
ν̂t∈HÂ
 sup
(X ν̂T ,ĉt)∈L̂2
E
[
Lν̂t,T − ην̂
(∫ T
0
ctZ
ν̂
t dt+X
ν̂
TZ
ν̂
T −X0
)] . (3.34)
InsertingX ν̂,optT and ĉ
opt
t into the fictitious value function thus recovers the dual objective
in Theorem 3.2. As a result, the dual objective harmonizes with opting for the worst-case
fictitious market. Similarly, for any ν̂t ∈ HÂ, the objective in (3.33) supplies an upper
bound on (3.22), implying that the dual coincides with selecting the lowest possible upper
bound. By strong duality, this least-favourable choice rallies the constrained baseline
financial marketM, wherein ĉoptt , x̂optt meet the admissibility requirements enclosed by
ÂX0 . The link between ν̂t and the economic scenarios is evident from the SPD (2.11).
3.3 Optimality Incomplete Markets
This section concludes by illustrating the main findings in Theorem 3.2 for the case of
non-traded risk. We use a terminal wealth framework that mildly adjusts the economic
15Under the stricture δ(ν̂t) = −ν̂>t xt for ν̂t ∈ HÂ, Y −10 YtB−1t functions as SPD inM. If this condition
is not met, then a recovery of {xt}t∈[0,T ] in M fails, but succeeds for {x̂t}t∈[0,T ] in Mν̂ . The optimal
decisions {x̂optt }t∈[0,T ] in the fictitiousMν̂ may therefore not be admissible inM for every ν̂t ∈ HÂ.
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setting in section 2. Herewith, we aim to expound the benefit of an approximate method.
To accomplish which, reconsider M, set σS1t :=
[
σS1t , 0m×d
]>, σS2t := [0d×m, σS2t ]>, and
restrict St to its first d entries such that solely W 1t is driving St. Moreover, we impose a
trading restriction through K ⊆ Rd+m as K = Rd × {0}m: W 2t is not traded.16
In the fictitiousMν̂ , the support function and barrier cone change into δ (ν̂t) = 0 <
∞, for ν̂t ∈ A˜X0 := {0}d × D1,2 ([0, T ])m, which identically relates to ν̂t ∈ HÂ =
{0}d ×D1,2 ([0, T ])m. Therefore, suppose that ν̂t =
[
ν̂1,t, ν̂2,t
]>, then inMν̂ we must have
that ν̂1,t = 0d and ν̂2,t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])m hold. The artificial non-traded asset abides by
dDt
Dt
=
(
Rf,t1m + σ
S2
t λ2,t + ν̂2,t
)
dt+ σS2t dW
2
t , D0 = 1m, (3.35)
wherein ν̂2,t is “free” to realize values in the entirety of D1,2 ([0, T ])
m, which coalesces with
the inability to evaluate the price of unhedgeable uncertainty. These requirements spell out
an artificial market wherein St remains as a traded asset, because St is ab initio unaffected
by the undiversifiable {W 2t }t∈[0,T ] on account of σS2t = 0d+m×m, and ν̂1,t = 0d. Furthermore,
Bt = B̂t continues to live inMν̂ due to δ (ν̂t) = 0, and we group Ŝt = [St, Dt]>.
To alleviate notation, let us separate x̂t as x̂t = [xt, xf,t]
>, in which xt is the allocation
to St in the true marketM and xf,t the proportion of wealth invested in Dt. Then,
dX ν̂t = X
ν̂
t
[(
Rf,t + x
>
t σ
S1
t λ1,t + x
>
f,tσ
S2
t λ̂2,t
)
dt+ x>t σ
S1
t dW
1
t + x
>
f,tσ
S2
t dW
2
t
]
, (3.36)
describes the artificial wealth process, where we let λ̂2,t = λ2,t + σS2t
−1
ν̂2,t for brevity.
Additionally, we suppress inclusion of a consumption process, inasmuch as we confine
the analysis to an investor who derives utility from solely horizon wealth, for the sake
of lucidity. Admissibility of x̂t in the artificial market Mν̂ inherits its definition from
(2.13). Note that admissibility in the constrained environmentM holds only if xf,t = 0m.
Ultimately, we observe that the fictitious dynamic allocation problem reads as17
sup
X ν̂T∈L2(Ω)
E
[
U
(
X ν̂T ,ΠT
)]
s.t. E
[
X ν̂TZ
ν̂
T
] ≤ X0. (3.37)
In application to the previous setting, we proceed by breaking down Theorems 3.1
and 3.2 into three propositions. The first proposition concerns optimality in the artificial
environmentMν̂ . The second proposition poses the dual problem along with restrictions
invoked on the the multiplier process. The last proposition retains optimality inM.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the problem in (3.37). Then, optimal horizon wealth follows
Xoptt = E
[
I
(H−1 (X0)Z ν̂T ,ΠT )Z ν̂t,T ∣∣ Ft] , ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.38)
16Practically, K = Rd × {0}m ascertains partial hedgeability of {Πt}t∈[0,T ].
17This problem inM is sup{xt}∈Â′X0 E [U (XT ,ΠT )] s.t. dXt = Xt
[(
Rf,t+x
>
t σ
S1
t λ1,t
)
dt+x>t σ
S1
t dW
1
t
]
.
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where ηopt := Ĥ−1 (X0) characterizes the multiplier.18 The optimal portfolio rises from
x̂optt =
(
Z ν̂t X
opt
t σ̂
>
t
)−1 {
E
[DWt Z ν̂TXoptT ∣∣ Ft]+ λ̂tE [Z ν̂TXoptT ∣∣ Ft]} . (3.39)
Then, define the previsible projections of transformed RRA (proxies) as
R2t
(
I
(
ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
,ΠT
)−1
= −E
[
Z ν̂T
E[XoptT Z
ν̂
T | Ft]
U ′X
(
XoptT ,ΠT
)
U ′′XX
(
XoptT ,ΠT
) ∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
R1t
(
I ′Y
(
ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
,ΠT
)−1
= −E
[
E
[
XoptT Z
ν̂
T
∣∣ Ft]−1I ′Y (ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) M̂T ∣∣∣ Ft] ,
(3.40)
where we abbreviateR1t := R1t
(
I ′Y
(
ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
,ΠT
)−1 andR2t := R2t (I (ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) ,ΠT ).
Define R̂it,T such that Rit = E
[R̂it,T ∣∣ Ft] for i = 1, 2. Then, xoptf,t keeps itself to
xoptf,t = σ
S2
t
>−1(R1t (I ′Y (ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) ,ΠT )−1 G ′1t,T
+
(
1−R2t
(
I
(
ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
,ΠT
)−1)G ′2t,T +R2t (I (ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) ,ΠT )−1 λ̂2,t). (3.41)
The hedging coefficients in optimal x̂optt are given λ̂f,t =
[
λ1,t, λ̂2,t
]> equal to
G2t,T = R2tE
[
−R̂2t,T
(
−
∫ T
t
[
DWt Rf,sds+DWt λ̂f,s
(
dWs + λ̂f,sds
)]) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]
G1t,T = R1tE
[
−R̂1t,T
(∫ T
t
([
DWt pis −DWt ξ̂s · ξ̂s
]
ds+DWt ξ̂sdWs
)
+ ξ̂t
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] , (3.42)
where G1t,T =
[G ′′1t,T ,G ′1t,T ]> and G2t,T = [G ′′2t,T ,G ′2t,T ]>. Hence, x̂optt springs from the analytic
for xoptf,t : replace σ
S2
t by σ̂t, and the terms G ′1t,T and G ′2t,T by respectively G1t,T and G2t,T .19
Proof. The results and corresponding proof emanate trivially from Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.3 summarizes the optimal solutions to the fictitious terminal wealth
problem in (3.37), which amounts to showcasing an adjusted version of combined elements
that establish Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. By implication, the interpretation of results roughly
shadows those of the latter two. There are, however, three aspects that are different in
view of the artificial market Mν̂ incorporating the unspecified shadow prices ν̂t ∈ HÂ:
(i) the optimal controls that explicitly depend on ν̂2,t, (ii) an altered decomposition as in
(3.13), and (iii) the dormant existence of a ν̂2,t such that xoptf,t = 0m. As to item (i):
x̂optt =
(
B−1t X
opt
t σ̂
>
t
)−1
EQ
ν̂
[
DWt B−1T XoptT −B−1T XoptT
∫ T
t
DWt λ̂f,sdWQν̂s
]
(3.43)
18Here, Ĥ : R+ → R+ follows from Ĥ (η) = E
[
I
(
ηZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
Z ν̂T
]
, and Z ν̂t,T := Z
ν̂
t
−1
Z ν̂T .
19Replacing the terms in parentheses for G1t,T and G2t,T in (3.42) by respectively (
∫ T
t
DW 2t pisds+ ξΠ2t )
and (− ∫ T
t
(DW 2t Rf,sds+DW
2
t λ̂2,sdW
2,Qλ̂2
s )) generates the optimal fictitious allocation x
opt
f,t to Dt.
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shows reminiscent of (3.12) that the optimal portfolio decisions depend on the measure
Qν̂ that induces in conjunction with B̂t inMν̂ the SPD. Endogeneity of ν̂2,t underpinning
the non-unicity of this measure Qν̂ demonstrates that x̂optt is subject to a potentially
preference-specific input. The indefinite shadow prices ν̂2,t thus also enjoy the power to
alter x̂optf,t . The dual problem employs this quality to effectuate x
opt
f,t = 0m.
20
In reference to item (ii), we imitate the decomposition procedure applied to acquire
(3.13), which commands that x̂optt is detachable as x̂
opt
t = x̂
m
t + x̂
Z
t + x̂
Π
t , wherein
x̂Zt = −σ̂>
−1
t
R2t
1−R2t
E
[
R̂2t,T
(
−
∫ T
t
[
DWt Rf,sds+DWt λ̂f,sdWs
]) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]
x̂Πt = −σ̂>
−1
t E
[
R̂1t,T
(∫ T
t
([
DWt pis −DWt ξ̂s · ξ̂s
]
ds+DWt ξ̂sdWs
)
+ ξ̂t
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] , (3.44)
are respectively fictitious nominal stochastic deflator and commodity price hedges. The first
rule concerns the ordinary tangency mean-variance efficient portfolio x̂mt =
1
R2t (σ̂t
>)−1λ̂t.21
The shadow prices ν̂2,t affect all three disentangled portfolio demands, due to the fact that
{λ̂f,t}t∈[0,T ] embeds {ν̂2,t}t∈[0,T ], and so do the (previsible) RRA coefficients.22
Lastly, taking note of λ̂2,t’s endogenity, or coequally ν̂2,t’s endogeneity, within the
expression (3.41) of Proposition 3.3 for x̂optt , we find that the next identity for λ̂2,t
λ̂2,t =
(
1−R2t
(
XoptT ,ΠT
))G ′2t,T −R2t (XoptT ,ΠT )R1t (XoptT ,ΠT )−1G ′1t,T (3.45)
gratifies according to (3.41) to repeal any allocation to Dt: contingent on ν̂2,t obeying
(3.45), xoptf,t = 0m holds. Note that the RHS of the latter equality may ingrain {λ̂2,t}t∈[0,T ],
instigating non-linearity into (3.45). In general, the expression for λ̂2,t therefore designates
a full backward-forward equation, see Detemple (2014) for similar arguments. As this
approach towards collecting λ̂2,t is provisional, we next turn to the duality concepts.
Proposition 3.4. Consider the constrained analogue of the portfolio choice problem in
(3.37) in the baseline marketM. Introduce a strictly positive martingale process
dYt = Yt
[
β>1,tdW
1
t + β̂
>
2,tdW
2
t
]
(3.46)
for some Lagrange multiplier Y0 ∈ R+, where β1,t = φM1t − ξΠ1t and ‖β̂2,t‖2L1([0,T ])m ∈ D1,2.
Then, the following inequality holds for any x̂t s.t. xf,t = 0m, Y0 and β̂2,t
E [U (XT ,ΠT )] ≤ E
[
V
(
YTB
−1
T ,ΠT
)]
+ Y0X0, (3.47)
20In the third proposition, we show that minimizing the dual — choosing the least-favourable fictitious
completionMν̂ among all feasible ν̂t ∈ HÂ — indeed ensures xoptf,t = 0m such that x̂optt ∈ Â′X0 .
21Cognate to x̂t = [xt, xf,t]
>, the three demands separate into a fictitious “xf,t” part and a true “xt”
part. Changing the Malliavin kernel to DW 1t or DW
2
t in (3.44) isolates the true from fictitious demands.
22The two-fund separation principle is by analogy with (3.15) as well visible through (3.44).
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where V denotes U ’s convex conjugate. Consequently, the dual variant of the unconstrained
dynamic asset allocation problem unfolds itself in the following fashion
inf
β̂2,t∈D1,2([0,T ])m,Y0∈R+
E
[
V
(
YTB
−1
T ,ΠT
)]
+ Y0X0. (3.48)
In addition to that, because xt = 0d is feasible, strong duality persists:
sup
{x̂t}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
E [U (XT ,ΠT )] = inf
β̂2,t∈D1,2([0,T ])m,Y0∈R+
E
[
V
(
YTB
−1
T ,ΠT
)]
+ Y0X0. (3.49)
Suppose that β̂opt2,t and Y
opt
0 solve (3.48). Then, optimal terminal wealth complies with
XoptT = I
(
Y optT B
−1
T ,ΠT
)
. Complementary slackness alternatively commands that
sup
{xt}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
∫ T
0
(
E
[
ŜTYTBT
−1
∣∣∣ Ft]− E [YT | Ft] ŜtBt−1)> dXtŜ−1t  x̂t <∞. (3.50)
indicating that β̂t = −λ̂f,t such that Y −10 YTB−1T = B−1T dQν̂/dP agrees with Z ν̂T inMν̂.23
Proof. The proof for this proposition arises out of the one for Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3.4 encompasses in conformity with the results in Theorem 3.2 the dual
problem corresponding to its primal congener, which is essential to the fictitious specifica-
tion in (3.37). In effect, the artificial market is a by-product of the dual concretization and
assists in reconciling the baseline constrained marketM with this fictitious economyMν̂ .
Consistent with Theorem 3.2, in the present case, Mν̂ finds its definition from the CS
condition (3.50) via which Y −10 Yt = dQν̂/dP|Ft ought to be true. Hence, with due regard
for the numéraire-based avenue in (3.17), the dual implicates minimization over
Y −10 Yt = Z
ν̂
t Bt = E
(
λ>1,t
)
exp
(
−1
2
∫ T
0
λ̂>2,tλ̂2,tdt−
∫ T
0
λ̂2,tdW
2
t
)
(3.51)
for unspecified ν̂t ∈ HÂ, which confirms that the dual objective unifies itself with opting
for a probability measure in an effort to malignly affect utility levels and therewith to
make trades in Dt utmost unappealing. The choice for this pricing measure namely acts
via
{
λ̂2,t
}
t∈[0,T ] purely upon the pricing of non-traded uncertainty {W 2t }t∈[0,T ].
To expound this phenomenon, let us defineMβ2 := {Qβ2 ∼ P | EQβ2 [B−1t St ∣∣ Fs] =
B−1s Ss, E
Qβ2
[
B−1t Dt
∣∣ Fs]−B−1s Ds ∈ R dt⊗ P-a.e., ∀ 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T}. Thereupon,
inf
Qβ2∈Mβ2 ,η∈R+
E
[
V
(
ηB−1T
dQβ2
dP
,ΠT
)]
+ ηX0, (3.52)
23The CS condition β̂t = −λ̂f,t descends from the fact that xt ∈ Rd dt ⊗ P-a.e., which mandates
{Yt}t∈[0,T ] to operate as dQdP
∣∣
Ft , 0 ≤ t ≤ T with regard to {W 1t }t∈[0,T ]. Concurrently, as to {W 2t }t∈[0,T ],
the stricture xf,t = 0m decrees that {Yt}t∈[0,T ] is unrestrained when it comes to pricing Dt.
19
for Lagrange multiplier η := Y0, unwinds a substitute for the dual in (3.48), underlining the
separability of the controllable Radon-Nikodym derivative from the effectively exogenous
nominal interest rate.24 Assume that Qβ
opt
2 ∈ Mβ2 is optimal to (3.52), then M̂T =
exp
( − ∫ T
0
(
Rf,s − pis − (β̂opts )>ξ̂s
)
ds
)E([φM1t , β̂opt2,t + ξΠ2t ]>) defines the analogue of the
pricing kernel MT under xf,t = 0m. Hence, whilst Rf,t remains exogenous, rt in the
constrained marketM contours ex-post an effectively endogenous process.
Lastly, let us conducive to the approximating dual control mechanism derive that
sup
{x̂t}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
E [U (XT ,ΠT )] ≤ inf
β̂2,t∈P,Y0∈R+
E
[
V
(
YTB
−1
T ,ΠT
)]
+X0Y0 (3.53)
where P ⊆ D1,2 ([0, T ])m is closed and convex. This inequality ascertains that the repression
of D1,2 ([0, T ])m to P begets an upper bound on the optimal value function in virtue of
(3.47) and strong duality (3.49). In the same way, the restriction to P may procreate
a lower bound in the primal problem.25 Combining these two outcomes, contraction of
D1,2 ([0, T ])m raises lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function.
We complete the exposition of this theoretical example by solving the dual (3.52). In
light of this, let W({β̂2,t}, Y0) = E [V (YTB−1T ,ΠT )]+ Y0X0, and discern that
∆W = E
[
V ′X
(
YT
BT
,ΠT
)
YT
BT
∫ T
0
(
φ>t dW
2
t − β̂>2,tφtdt
)]
+O
(
‖φt‖D1,2([0,T ])m
)
, (3.54)
where W : D1,2 ([0, T ])m ×R+ is the unconstrained objective in consonance with (3.52),
φt and β̂2,t are such that φt, β̂2,t + φt ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])m, and V ′X denotes the derivative of V
in its fist argument. Further, we let O denote the Landau function. Then, ∆W describes
the effect on W due to a small perturbation φt on β̂2,t. Applying the argument that small
perturbations around the optimal controls must have insignificant effects on W, setting
∆W equal to zero recovers the optimal β̂2,t.26 We formalize this in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5. Consider the dual optimization problem (3.48) in compliance with the
fictitious specification (3.37) for the optimal allocation to assets. Then,
λ̂opt2,t = −E
[
B−1T Y
opt
T X
opt
T
∣∣ Ft]−1E [DW 2t B−1T Y optT XoptT ∣∣∣ Ft]
=
(
1−R2t
(
XoptT ,ΠT
))G ′2t,T −R2t (XoptT ,ΠT )R1t (XoptT ,ΠT )−1G ′1t,T (3.55)
itemizes an equality wherefrom we can extract λ̂opt2,t that optimizes the dual. Further,
Ĥ (ηopt) = E[I(ηoptZ ν̂T ,ΠT )Z ν̂T ] = X0 (3.56)
24Observe that (3.52) lines as in (3.34) up with choosing the least-favourable completion.
25The set Â′X0 reduces to one that complies with all λ̂2,t ∈ P. The investor is accordingly incapable of
optimally protecting him-or herself against injurious shifts in
{
W 2t
}
t∈[0,T ], implying such a lower bound.
26We interchangeably use β̂2,t and −λ̂2,t as well as Z ν̂t and Y −10 YtB−1t ; these unequivocally are equivalent.
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qualifies the identity from which we are able to distil the unique multiplier ηopt = Y0 =
Ĥ−1 (X0). The optimal portfolio rules concerning the allocation to St obey to
xoptt = σ
S1
t
>−1(R1t (I ′Y (ηZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) ,ΠT )−1 G1x,t,T
+
(
1−R2t
(
I
(
ηZ ν̂T ,ΠT
)
,ΠT
)−1)G2x,t,T +R2t (I (ηZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) ,ΠT )−1 λ1,t), (3.57)
in addition to xf,t = 0m. The other conditions arising out of Proposition 3.3 remain in
force. In harmony with (3.44), xoptt = x
m,opt
t + x
Z,opt
t + x
Π,opt
t holds, in which27
σS1t
>
xZ,optt = −
R2t
1−R2t
E
[
R̂2t,T
(
−
∫ T
t
[
DW 1t Rf,sds+DW
1
t λ̂f,sdW
Qν̂
s
]) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] (3.58)
characterizes the identity for the stochastic deflator hedge, and where
σS1t
>
xΠ,optt = −E
[
R̂1t,T
(∫ T
t
(
DW 1t pisds+DW
1
t ξ̂s
(
dWs − ξ̂sds
))
+ ξ̂t
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] (3.59)
defines the equality from where we deduce the commodity price hedge; xm,optt = R2t−1σS1t
>−1
λ1,t
spells out the mean-variance portfolio. More, the hedging coefficients read
G2x,t,T = R2tE
[
−R̂2t,T
(
−
∫ T
t
[
DW 1t
(
Rf,sds+ λ̂f,sdW
Qν̂
s
)]) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]
G1x,t,T = R1tE
[
−R̂1t,T
(∫ T
t
(
DW 1t pisds+DW
1
t ξ̂s
(
dWs − ξ̂sds
))
+ ξΠ1t
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] (3.60)
provoking the portfolio rules in (3.57), where DW 1t Rf,s = DW 1rs +DW 1pis −DW 1λ>s ξ̂s.28
Proof. Reconsider the objective function in (3.48), delimited byW : D1,2 ([0, T ])m×R+ →
R. Notice that D1,2 ([0, T ])m ⊂ L2 (Ω× [0, T ])m. Let ψt ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])m, then:
D{β̂2,t}W {ψt} = E
[
V ′X
(
YT
BT
,ΠT
)
YT
BT
{
−
∫ T
0
β̂>2,tψtdt+
∫ T
0
ψ>t dW
2
t
}]
= 0. (3.61)
The foregoing specifies the Fréchet derivative and ought to equal 0. We simplify
D{β̂2,t}W {ψt} = −E
[∫ T
0
XoptT Z
ν̂
T
(
δ (ψt)− β>2,tψtdt
) ]
= −
∫ T
0
E
[
ψ>t E
[
DW 2t XoptT Z ν̂T − β̂2,tXoptT Z ν̂T
∣∣∣ Ft] ]dt = 0,
(3.62)
where we use XoptT = I
(
B−1T YT ,ΠT
)
, Z ν̂T = B
−1
T YT , and the Hermitian adjoint result. As a
27We employ the definitions for R1t and R2t along with R̂1t,T and R̂2t,T from Proposition 3.3.
28Optimality of λ̂f,t depends on K’s definition and is thus case-specific, whence we provide the proof.
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consequence,
〈
E
[DW 2t I( YTBT ,ΠT ) YTBT − β̂2,tI( YTBT ,ΠT ) YTBT ∣∣ Ft], ψt〉L2(Ω×[0,T ]) = 0. By virtue
of the Riesz-Fréchet representation theorem, derive given Rx,T := I ′X(ηZ ν̂T ,ΠT )ηZ ν̂T that
β̂opt2,t = E
[
XoptT Z
ν̂
T
∣∣ Ft]−1E [DW 2t XoptT Z ν̂T ∣∣∣ Ft] = E [XoptT Z ν̂T ∣∣ Ft]−1
× E
[(Rx,T +XoptT )DW 2t Z ν̂T + I ′Y (ηZ ν̂T ,ΠT ) M̂TDW 2t log (ΠT ) ∣∣∣ Ft] (3.63)
leading to β̂opt2,t = −
(
1−R2t
(
XoptT ,ΠT
))G ′2t,T +R2t (XoptT ,ΠT )R1t (XoptT ,ΠT )−1G ′1t,T .
The multiplier Y opt0 ∈ R+ induces XoptT = I
(
Ĥ−1(X0)Y −10 YT optBT−1,ΠT ) from
−DY0Wκ = E
[(
I
(
Y0Z
ν̂
T ,ΠT
)
Z ν̂T −X0
)
κ
]
=
〈
XoptT Z
ν̂
T −X0, κ
〉
L2(Ω)
= 0, (3.64)
for all κ ∈ R+. Then, β̂opt2,t ensures that {x̂optt }t∈[0,T ] ∈ Â′X0 such that XoptT is both feasible
and optimal in the constrained marketM, attributable to strong duality (3.49).29
The aforestated theorem extricates two ingredients in connection with optimal solutions
to the constrained utility maximization problem inM: (i) the choice for ν̂2,t so that the
allocation to Dt abrogates in Proposition 3.3, and (ii) the optimality criteria imposed on
the primal controls x̂t and XT that accede with this expression for ν̂opt2,t . As for the former
item, we note that the optimal shadow prices ν̂opt2,t result from accurately minimizing the
dual. Moreover, its equivalence with (3.45) is unambiguous. As to the last element, we
observe in consideration of (3.37) that the static problem inM defers to30
sup
XT∈L2(Ω)
E [U (XT ,ΠT )] s.t. E
[
XTZ
ν̂
T
] ≤ X0, ν̂2,t = ν̂opt2,t . (3.65)
The preceding three propositions place a strong emphasis on the linking nature of
the dual between the constrained primal problem inM and the unconstrained fictitious
specification in Mν̂ for the case of non-traded risk.31 In particular, for each choice of
ν̂t ∈ HÂ, we acquire by means of the dual an artificial market that assigns an upper bound
to the optimal value function. Adequately minimizing the dual, i.e. choosing the least
advantageousMν̂ or the smallest upper bound, then recovers a shadow price that induces
optimality in the constrainedM. It is, however, in general arduous to analytically obtain
this price, cf. (3.45). Therefore, we subsequently outline an approximate method.
4 Approximate Method
This section develops our dual control framework for approximating trading strategies. We
cultivate the technique on the grounds of the economic setup in section 2. To surmount
29Principally, Proposition 3.5 develops from inserting
{
x̂optt
}
t∈[0,T ] into Proposition 3.3.
30Employing the solution techniques from Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.3 yields Proposition 3.5.
31For restrictions that differ from K = Rd × {0}m, consider for instance Cuoco (1997) or Tepla (2000).
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the typical absence of closed-form expressions in Theorem 3.2, we confine the space of
feasible β̂t to some closed and convex set.32 The procedure then resides in the information
that this theorem environs, such that an analytical approximation to the truly optimal
investment decisions may result. Duality principles spawn lower and upper bounds on the
optimal value function, accrediting us to gauge the method’s accuracy. We append the
blueprint of the approximate method with an example linked to section 3.3.
4.1 Projection Feasible Strategies
We commence with the description of the method by underscoring that its substructure
consists in a twofold procedure. That is, we first cage the set of dual controls β̂t to a closed
and convex set, P ⊆ D1,2 ([0, T ])n, which makes up the cornerstone that invigorates the
technique at the outset, cf. the analysis around (3.45). Second, we prescribe a projection
operator commensurate with a case-dependent metric that casts the infeasible dual-optimal
portfolio rules into the pre-specified feasible region Â′X0 that concurs with the limited
space of controls P . The inequality that lies at the root of this method is
sup
{xt,ct}t∈[0,T ]∈ÂPX0
JL
(
X0, {xt, ct}t∈[0,T ]
)
≤ inf
β̂t∈HPA∩P,Y0∈R+
JU
(
X0, Y0,
{
β̂t
}
t∈[0,T ]
)
, (4.1)
where ÂPX0 comprehends all admissible strategies that comport with β̂t ∈ HPν̂ ∩ P for
β̂t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])n. Moreover, JL and JU denote respectively the primal (2.15) and dual
(3.22) objectives. Theorem 3.2 affirms that (4.1) binds if and only if P = D1,2 ([0, T ])n or
β̂optt ∈ P , which betokens that the anomaly from the optimal value function, say Jopt, as
regards JL and JU alternates with the efficacy of the approximation to β̂t.
Convex duality in combination with the contraction of shadow prices to P breaks as
reported by Theorem 3.2 in general down when it comes to assuring that {x̂t, ct}t∈[0,T ] ∈
ÂPX0 . To overstep the consequential analytical impossibility of solving the LHS of (4.1),
we approximate terminal wealth XoptT and the congruous consumption streams c
opt
t by
X∗T = X0 +
∫ T
0
(
Rf,tX
∗
t − ĉP,optt
)
dt+
∫ T
0
projÂ′PX0
x̂opt,>t σ̂tX
∗
t
(
dWt + λ̂tdt
)
, (4.2)
where we let projÂ′PX0
: L2 (Ω× [0, T ])n → Â′PX0 be the projection kernel tallying with an
operator that maps any n-dimensional state-wise square-integrable investment plan to the
region of admissible trading strategies {xt}t∈[0,T ] in the constrained economyM, i.e. Â′PX0 .
Furthermore, we set ĉP,optt =
(
ĉoptt /X
opt
t
)|β̂t∈HPÂ∩PX∗t , wherein ĉoptt , x̂optt and Xoptt are the
optimal controls inherent in the dual of Theorem 3.2. Addedly, we note that approximate
terminal wealth X∗T depends on its past values, which are procurable by means of X∗T |T=t.
32Rather than restricting ν̂t to a coequal set, we choose to apply the principle to β̂t for mathematical
elegance. The rudiments of the method do nonehteless not alter for impediments with respect to ν̂t.
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Note that the optimality conditions in the unconstrainedMν̂ , i.e. those in Theorem
3.2 for undetermined β̂t, are analytically available. The truly optimal XoptT and c
opt
t for
constrained
{
x̂optt
}
t∈[0,T ] are equal to these closed-form formulae for some
{
β̂t
}
t∈[0,T ] such
that {x̂t, ct}t∈[0,T ] ∈ ÂX0 holds.33 These initial portfolio rules are thus affected in terms
of their admissibility inM by sole modifications of β̂t. The elemental idea then is that
under the reservation of D1,2 ([0, T ])n to P, these decisions are practically equal to the
ones in Theorem 3.2 for unspecified β̂t ∈ HPÂ ∩ P and Y0 ∈ R+. We next endeavour to
compensate for remaining inaccuracies by “pruning” x̂optt |β̂t∈HPÂ∩P towards an identity that
meets the admissibility criteria with the help of the projection operator.34
The preceding method administers an admissible and consequently a budget-feasible
pair
{
projÂ′PX0
x̂optt , ĉ
P,opt
t
}
t∈[0,T ] for any β̂t ∈ HPÂ ∩ P . So as to determine β̂t, consider
DP
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
:= inf
θ̂U,∗t ∈HPÂ∩P×R
JU
(
X0,
{
θ̂U,∗t
})− sup
θ̂L,∗t ∈HPÂ∩P×R
ĴL
(
X0,
{
θ̂L,∗t
})
, (4.3)
which delimits under X∗T in (4.2) the smallest duality gap affiliated with the circumscription
to P, where we separate the unspecified approximate controls on the primal side θ̂L,∗t =(
β̂L,∗t , Y
L,∗
0
)
from those on the dual side θ̂U,∗t =
(
β̂L,∗t , Y
L,∗
0
)
. More, we let ĴL be the primal
value function that ensues after insertion of
{
projÂ′PX0
x̂optt , ĉ
P,opt
t
}
t∈[0,T ]. This quantification
of the smallest duality gap contingent on the outlined approximation underpins the notion
that the approximate rules lodge apart from the undetermined shadow prices also the
undefined Lagrange multipliers. The approximations to the portfolio rules and consumption
streams by respectively projÂ′PX0
x̂optt and ĉ
P,opt
t are after maximization of ĴL in keeping
with the most-right term in (4.3) enitrely identified via the successive θ̂L,∗t .
Normally, we acquire θ̂U,∗t analytically. Hence, as contrasted with the approach in (4.2),
X∗T = X0 +
∫ T
0
(
Rf,tX
∗
t − ĉP,optf,t
)
dt+
∫ T
0
p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂opt,>t σ̂tX
∗
t
(
dWt + λ̂tdt
)
, (4.4)
in which p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂opt,>t = projÂ′PX0
x̂opt,>t
∣∣
θ̂L,∗t =θ̂
U,∗
t
and ĉP,optf,t = ĉ
P,opt
t
∣∣
θ̂L,∗t =θ̂
U,∗
t
, formulates
an alternative approximation to XoptT and c
opt
t that is fully analytical. Herewith, the
approximation to the optimal rules authorizes us in a meaningful manner — dependent on
the quality of the approximation to β̂optt interlaced with the repression to P — to detour
all possible numerical effort involved in optimizing the primal objective ĴL. We base the
suitability as concerns the immediate injection of the analytically obtainable dual controls
θ̂U,∗t for θ̂
L,∗
t into the approximate rules implicit in (4.2) on the fact that θ̂
L,∗
t = θ̂
U,∗
t in
general holds only if DP
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
= 0. This concretely evinces that practically identical
33Theorem 3.2 spells out xoptt inM under the premise that β̂optt essentially optimizes the dual. In this
analysis, we utilize these equalities for xoptt given undefined β̂t, resembling x̂
opt
t inMν̂ .
34We exclusively mention x̂optt |β̂t∈HÂ∩P here, because ĉt
P,opt does not interfere with x̂t’s admissibility.
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approximate primal and dual parameters accompany trifling optimality gaps.
The exceptional instances in which the duality gap depletes to zero are when the
restricted set P cleaves with the truly optimal shadow prices β̂t, or when we let P coincide
with the original set D1,2 ([0, T ])n. In all other cases, DP
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
> 0 is true. Hence, to
make the size of the duality gap tangible for both types of approximations in (4.2) and
(4.4), we compute the so-called compensating variation. To that end, we examine
ĴL,opt
(
X0 + CV ,
{
θ̂L,∗t
})
= inf
θ̂U,∗t ∈HÂ×R
JU
(
X0,
{
θ̂U,∗t
})
+ DP
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
, (4.5)
wherein we let ĴL,opt be the primal objective in (4.3) resulting from either of the two
approximate modes, corresponding to the initial endowment X0 ∈ R+. Here, we denote
the compensating variation by CV ∈ R+. The aforesaid quantity defines the amount of
capital that one must add to X0 in order to overpass DP
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
. Economically, the
magnitude of CV translates the utilitarian loss incurred due to the approximation into a
monetary loss. The annual equivalent, CV 1T , abides by the interpretation of a management
fee that protects the agent against shifts in the (partially) undiversifiable {Wt}t∈[0,T ].35
4.2 Stepwise Approximating Routine
We proceed by describing the approximate method for P ⊆ D1,2 ([0, T ])n in terms of a
stepwise routine involving Monte Carlo. Although the previous approximations to xoptt ac-
commodated in Theorem 3.2 are fully analytical, the approximate objective ĴL,opt typically
does not induce a closed-form formula. Considering further probable practical purposes, we
amplify the routine. We first discuss some necessary notation and interconnected features.
Let us rewrite the equality for approximate wealth, (4.2) or (4.4), as follows
log (X∗T ) = log
(
X0
)
+
∫ T
0
(
Rf,t − c∗t −
1
2
x¯>,∗t x¯
∗
t
)
dt+
∫ T
0
x¯>,∗t
(
dWt + λ̂tdt
)
, (4.6)
where x¯>,∗t = x
>,∗
t σ̂
−1
t and c∗t = ĉ
P,opt
t X
∗
t
−1, in which x∗t is the approximation to x
opt
t .
Hereby, we ensure that X∗t > 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and eliminate the dependency
on X∗T
∣∣
T=t
, which would elseways discommode simulations. Note that X∗t differs from
E
[ ∫ T
t
c¨optt,u du+X
opt
T Y
opt
t,T Bt,T
−1 ∣∣ Ft] in Theorem 3.2, and that ĉP,optt restores post-factum
from c∗tX∗t . Bearing these facts in mind, we continue with the description of the method.
Step 1. Initialization of method. We initialize some N ∈ N denoting the num-
ber of paths for {Wt}t∈[0,T ]. Thereby, we discretize Ω into ωi ∈ Ω for i = 1, . . . , N .
Similarly, we fix an M ∈ N representing Wt’s number of time increments on [0, T ]. That
is, we partition [0, T ] into M equidistant intervals as 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tM = T such
35We refer the reader to de Palma and Prigent (2008) and de Palma and Prigent (2009) for details.
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that |ti − ti−1| = T/M for i ≥ 0. Conclusively, one may employ finite-difference methods
to simulate the state variables according to the sample space induced by N ×M .
Step 2. Wealth dynamics. Afterwards, we unscramble X∗T subsuming the approximate
x∗t and c∗t . Therefrom, we simulate the finite-difference analogue of the completely analyti-
cal log (X∗T ) in (4.6). The posterior process is equipped with unspecified θ̂
L,∗
t . We endow
state-dependent processes with ωj-notation. Approximate X∗T then agrees with
log (X∗T (ωj)) = log (X0) +
M∑
i=1
[
Rf,ti−1 (ωj) + x¯
>,∗
ti−1 (ωj)λ1,ti−1 − c∗t (ωj)
− 1
2
x¯>,∗ti−1 (ωj) x¯
∗
ti−1 (ωj)
]
∆ti +
M∑
i=1
x¯>,∗ti−1 (ωj)
(
W 1ti (ωj)−W 1ti−1 (ωj)
) (4.7)
for j = 1, . . . , N , where ∆ti = ti − ti−1, and x¯∗ti complies with the approximating portfolio
weights implicit in either projÂ′PX0
x̂optt or p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂optt . We simulate the log of X∗T so as to
safeguard X∗T > 0, cf. (4.6). The (former) rules’ discrete duplicates x¯∗ti depend on the
unspecified θ̂L,∗t , and follow from equation (3.31), as (non-)linear transformations of the
state variables. More, X∗tn results from taking the sums in (4.7) up to n = 1, . . . ,M .
Step 3. Shadow price and multiplier. We then continue with optimally deter-
mining the approximate shadow prices β̂L,∗t and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier
Y L,∗0 , i.e. θ̂
L,∗
t ∈ HPÂ ∩ P ×R. In particular, we employ standard optimization software to
maximize the lower bound on Jopt engendered by the following primal value function
ĴL =
1
N
N∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
u
(
c∗ti (ωj)X
∗
ti
(ωj) ,Πti (ωj)
)
∆ti +
1
N
N∑
j=1
U (X∗T (ωj) ,ΠT (ωj)) , (4.8)
over
(
β̂L,∗t , Y
L,∗
0
) ∈ HPA ∩ P ×R. The unavailability of closed-form formulae in addition
to analytically insuperable FOC’s stimulates the usage of such numerical algorithms.
Running times depend on the routine, and are as a result uninformative. Clearly, we
assume at this point that we are in possession of X∗tn for each n = 1, . . . ,M . Simulating
thisX∗tn is considered part of step 2. Notice that step 3 applies solely to projÂ′PX0
x̂optt . Hence:
• For projÂ′PX0 x̂
opt
t , apply numerical maximization of (4.8) initialized at θ̂
L,∗
t = θ̂
U,∗
t .
• In case of p̂rojÂ′PX0 x̂
opt
t , we set θ̂
L,∗
t = θ̂
U,∗
t a priori, whence one may skip step 3.
The first branch plainly acknowledges the non-unique nature of the controls θ̂L,∗t contained
within projÂ′PX0
x̂optt , and therefore coincides with pursuing step 3 as outlined. Further, it
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adds an element that aims to precipitate any running time by initializing the method
under scrutiny at the presumably analytically available dual controls θ̂U,∗t . The second
item applies to p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂optt , for which all numerical computation is entirely eliminated, on
account of its complete analytical characterization via pre-fixed θ̂L,∗t = θ̂
U,∗
t .36 Let us note
that, in this step, we couple cP,optt to projÂ′PX0
x̂optt and c
P,opt
f,t to p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂optt .37
Step 4. Performance evaluation. The final step consists in evaluating the per-
formance of the mechanism. Define D̂P
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
:= ĴU (X0)− ĴL,opt
(
X0
)
, where ĴU and
ĴL,opt are respectively the approximate analytical dual and approximate estimated primal
value functions. To recover CV , apply numerically facile root-finding modes to
ĴL,opt (X0 + CV) = Jopt + D̂P
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
= ĴU (X0) , (4.9)
wherein we search over all CV ∈ R+ such that this equality holds. Observe that CV ∈ R+
is unique, because it linearly enacts on X∗T and c∗tn that are both encompassed within
the strictly increasing utility functions u and U . Moreover, the LHS of this equation
comprises the optimal β̂L,∗t and Y
L,∗
0 from step 3 of the routine. This last step is obviously
superfluous in light of the technique; it exclusively serves to measure the precision.
We construe the stepwise approximating routine under the presumption that the dual
side of the problem renders analytical expressions for the dual controls θ̂U,∗ and the upper
value function ĴU . However, these expressions are absent in Theorem 3.2, since the dual
requires a full elucidation of K ⊆ Rd+m before it deciphers FOC’s for the (approximate)
dual controls θ̂U,∗t . An application analogous to step 3 on the dual side discharges this
postulate, and engenders estimates to θ̂U,∗ and ĴU that we may employ in steps 3/4.
4.3 Approximation Incomplete Markets
This section finalizes the analysis of the approximating procedure by casting the subject
into the context of the economic setup and problem specification of section 3.3. Recall
that the set of restrictions in that environment lives by K = Rd × {0}m such that
A˜PX0 = HPÂ = {−λ1,t} ×D1,2 ([0, T ])
m define the spaces in reference to β̂t. In the sequent
analysis, we let P = D1,2 ([0, T ])d ×Rm with the intention of portraying the mathematical
comfort that the approximate technology could entail. This P embodies D1,2 ([0, T ])d to
ensure β1,t = −λ1,t. Correspondingly, the approximate dual as per Theorem 3.2 reads
inf
β̂U,∗2,t ∈Rm,Y U,∗0 ∈R+
E
[
V
(
YTB
−1
T ,ΠT
)]
+ Y0X0, (4.10)
36The residual numerical effort involved with this approximate rule is due to steps 1 and 4. Step 4’s
running time is redundant. That of step 1 differs e.g. with dimensionality, see Detemple et al. (2006).
37In the description, we use cP,optt . Replacing this approximation by c
P,opt
f,t only has an effect on step 3.
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where we take advantage of HPÂ ∩D1,2 ([0, T ])
d ×Rm = {−λ1,t}d ×Rm. The confinement
marked by P hence effectively insures that the dual controls β̂U,∗2,t are only allowed to attain
values on the real line Rm. By this regulation, we aspire to approximate β̂opt2,t = −λ̂opt2,t in
(3.55) of Proposition 3.5 by a constant in an attempt to evade the computational strain
enmeshed with solving its backward-forward equation, in a simple way.38
On the dual side, we are able to amass an analytic for optimal β̂U,∗2,t . In specific,
D{β̂U,∗2,t }Ŵ {ψt} = −
∫ T
0
E
[
ψ>t
{
E
[
DW 2t XoptT Z ν̂T
]
− β̂U,∗2,t E
[
XoptT Z
ν̂
T
]}]
dt = 0, (4.11)
describes the FOC to the approximate dual (4.10) in the β̂U,∗2,t -direction, where we let Ŵ
be the objective function in (4.10). Resultantly, the optimal approximate dual control
must adhere to β̂U,∗2,t = E
[
XoptT Z
ν̂
T
]−1
E
[DW 2t XoptT Z ν̂T ], which is equal to the true FOC
in Proposition 3.5 for β̂opt2,t at its initialization point in time t = 0. In a like fashion,
the FOC for the corresponding approximate dual multiplier Y U,∗0 rises from the equality〈
I
(
Y U,∗0 B
−1
T YT ,ΠT
)
Y U,∗0
−1
B−1T YT −X0, κ̂
〉
L2(Ω)
= 0 for all κ̂ ∈ R+. In summary,
E
[
I
(
Y U,∗0 Z
ν̂
T ,ΠT
)
Z ν̂T
]
= X0, and β̂
U,∗
2,t =
(
1−R20
)G ′20,T −R2tR10−1G ′10,T (4.12)
urges an analytical system of two (non-linear) equations that we are able to solve for the
approximate dual shadow price β̂U,∗2,t and reciprocal Lagrange multiplier Y
U,∗
0 . In tandem
with both preceding dual controls included in θ̂U,∗t , the approximate dual objective function
ĴU (X0) finds its definition in closed-form. The dual side of the method is on this account
characterized by closed-form expressions for the controls and value function.
Let us now turn to the primal side. For that purpose, consider x̂optt in Proposition 3.3
along with the artificial wealth equation in (3.36). We transform this wealth process into
an admissible analogue by suppressing the dependency on xf,t, which then leads to
X∗T = X0 +
∫ T
0
(
Rf,t + x
opt,∗,>
t σ
S1
t λ1,t
)
X∗t dt+
∫ T
0
xopt,∗,>t σ
S1
t X
∗
t dW
1
t . (4.13)
Here, xopt,∗t contains the first d analytical entries of x̂
opt
t in (3.39) for undefined β̂t. This
enforcement of the trading constraint guarantees feasibility of X∗t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T . However,
we cannot analytically determine the β̂t that optimizes expected utility for these wealth
dynamics. For tractability with regard to numerically determining this β̂t, we confine the
set to of admissible β̂t to all HPÂ ∩ P , for P as used in (4.10), such that β1,t = −λ1,t and
β̂2,t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])m. This approach coheres with the description in section 4.1 under
projÂ′PX0
x = [xd, 0m]
> , ∀ x = [xd, xm] ∈ L2 (Ω× [0, T ])d+m , (4.14)
38For unconstrained P, i.e. P = D1,2 ([0, T ])d, we find according to Proposition 3.4 that β1,t = −λ1,t,
which is completely identified. Ergo, there is no reason to confine β1,t’s parameter space akin to β̂2,t’s.
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which dictates that xf,t = 0m. Considering that the actual optimal portfolio weights xoptt
in the baseline constrained environmentM, as given in Proposition 3.5, consist of x̂optt
including β̂optt whereon xf,t = 0m is imposed, this projection pertaining to P is plausible.39
At this stage, the procedure is identical for projÂ′PX0
x̂optt and p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂optt .
The approximation to XoptT in Proposition 3.5 by X
∗
T in (4.13) is budget-feasible and
admissible in the sense of ÂX0 , since xoptt in the aforesaid proposition is admissible for
β̂opt2,t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ])m in (3.55) implying that a reduction of D1,2 ([0, T ])m to Rm re β̂2,t’s
space of controls does not hamper xopt,∗t = projÂ′PX0
x̂optt ∈ ÂX0 . These rules sprout from
G2x,t,T = R2,∗t E
[
−R̂2,∗t,T
(
−
∫ T
t
[
DW 1t
(
Rf,sds+ λ̂f,sdW
Qν̂
s
)]) ∣∣∣∣ Ft]
G1x,t,T = R1,∗t E
[
−R̂1,∗t,T
(∫ T
t
(
DW 1t pisds+DW
1
t ξ̂s
(
dWs − ξ̂sds
))
+ ξΠ1t
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft] (4.15)
inserted into xopt,∗t = σ
S1
t
>−1(R1,∗t −1G1x,t,T +(1−R2,∗t −1)G2x,t,T +R2,∗t −1λ1,t), cf. Proposition
3.5. Independent of the selected approximation, either projÂ′PX0
x̂optt or p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂optt , the
approximate portfolio decisions xopt,∗t appertain to closed-form expressions for any θ̂
L,∗
t ∈
HPÂ ∩ P. Apropos of the former projection, we determine β̂
L,∗
2,t and Y
L,∗
0 by numerical
maximization of E [U (X∗T ,ΠT )] in the spirit of section 4.2 in order to wholly identify x
opt,∗
t .
Proceeding from p̂rojÂ′PX0
x̂optt , we take θ̂
L,∗
t from the system motivated by (4.12) and insert
these into xopt,∗t for full identification. In both cases, ĴL,opt follows through (4.8).
In xopt,∗t , we recognize in the shape of (3.44) three portfolio demands submitting to
xZ,opt,∗t = σ
S1
t
>−1 1
1−R2t
G2x,t,T , and xΠ,opt,∗t = σS1t
>−1 1
R1,∗t
G2x,t,T (4.16)
consistent with the decomposition xopt,∗t = x
m,opt,∗
t + x
Z,opt
t + x
Π,opt,∗
t , in which the mean-
variance efficient portfolio rule conforms to xm,optt = R2,∗t −1σS1t >
−1
λ1,t. These hedging
demands are up to the RRA coefficients that incorporate deterministic constants for the
shadow prices of non-traded risk equivalent to those presented in Proposition 3.3: we
empower the R terms with an asterisk to refine the difference from the true expressions.
Therewithal, observe that DW 1t λ̂f,s =
[DW 1t λ1,t, 0d×m], which connotes the deterministic
character and the total independence from W 2t of the approximate shadow prices.
5 Numerical Illustration
We complete the examination of the approximate method with a numerical analysis that
aspires to appraise the accuracy of the technique in an explicit economic framework that
39The projection is case-dependent; e.g. in respect of borrowing and short-sale constraints, cf. Tepla
(2000), i.e. K =
{
x ∈ Rn+ | x>1n ≤ 1
}
, a reasonable projection would be projÂ′PX0
x = max
{
0n, ‖
√
x‖−2Rnx
}
.
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Figure 1. Isoelastic and dual CRRA utility. The graph depicts the utility development for an
isoelastic agent and a dual CRRA agent. The matching risk-profiles adhere to γ = 5 and (γd, γu) = (10, 2)
for the (resp.) CRRA and dual CRRA investors. The reference level for the dual CRRA individual reads
K = 1 (vertically dotted line). At K = 1, this individual draws zero utility, U = 0 (horizontally dotted
line). Down-states of the world tally with ω ∈ Ω wherein XT /ΠT ≤ K. Conversely, all ω ∈ Ω in which
XT /ΠT > K coincide with the economic up-states, as separated by the vertically dotted line K = 1.
involves a definite problem setup. With this in view together with the antecedent scrutiny
of the incomplete markets setting, we discuss results in the environment of Brennan and
Xia (2002).40 At the heart of this illustration lies our dual CRRA utility function, which
constitutes a novel addition to the existing body of state-dependent preference conditions.
This qualification replaces the CRRA function in the economic outline at hand.
5.1 Dual CRRA Utility Function
We suppose that the agent from section 3.3 has in mind some benchmark, K ∈ R+,
regarding his/her horizon purchasing power, XT/ΠT . For states in which XT/ΠT ≤ K, the
agent draws proportionately less utility than in reversed states. Therefore, we attach K to
U , on account of which the dual CRRA function incorporates two isoelastic qualifications
UK (XT ,ΠT ) =
(K−1XT/ΠT )1−γd − 1
1− γd 1
{
XT
ΠT
≤K
} + (K−1XT/ΠT )1−γu − 1
1− γu 1
{
XT
ΠT
>K
} (5.1)
for coefficients of risk-aversion γd, γu ∈ R+ \ [0, 1] to forgo infinite utility, cf. Kramkov
and Schachermayer (1999). In order to convene (5.1) with the portrayed situation, we
dictate that γd ≥ γu. Hereby, we invoke that down-states correspond with an enhanced
40This financial market model eventuates a special case of the constrainedM in section 3.3.
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apprehension touching the attainment with reference to the exogenous K.41 The investor
under study retains total flexibility as to choosing K ante initium, before t = 0, resulting in
K being fundamentally exogenous over the full course of [0, T ]. Without loss of generality,
we normalize K = 1, such that UK |K=1:= U coalesces with the desires of an individual
who covets to maintain a constant degree of purchasing power.42
Technically, we observe that U (XT ,ΠT ) is continuous at XT = ΠT and state-dependent
by virtue of the accommodated separation of instances. Furthermore, we find that
U ′X =
X
−γd
T Π
−1+γd
T , if
XT
ΠT
≤ 1
X−γuT Π
−1+γu
T , if
XT
ΠT
> 1
; I =
X
− 1
γd
T Π
1− 1
γd
T , if
XT
ΠT
≥ 1
X
− 1
γu
T Π
1− 1
γu
T , if
XT
ΠT
< 1
(5.2)
define respectively marginal utility in the first argument and its inverse, both of which
are continuous at XT = ΠT as well. The second derivative of U in the first argument,
U ′′XX , follows straightforwardly. Note that U satisfies once continuous differentiability
in the XT -direction. Further, the inverse of marginal utility is piecewise continuously
differentiable with a single breakpoint at XT = ΠT . The mathematical description of the
dual CRRA stipulation thence aligns with section 2.3’s. Finally, the installment of two
CRRA utilities in (5.1) occasions a qualification that displays non-constant RRA:43
1− I ′Y ΠT = −
(
XT
U ′′XX
U ′X
)−1
=
1
γd
1{XT
ΠT
≤1
} + 1
γu
1{XT
ΠT
>1
}. (5.3)
In Figure 1, we exemplify the evolution of dual CRRA preferences, characterized by
γd = 10 and γu = 2, jointly with those for a CRRA agent, rising from γd = γu = 5 in (5.1).
The discrepancy between the trajectories displays itself in a salient tone for the dual CRRA
individual by a comparatively intensified utility development in “up-states” (XT/ΠT > K)
and a relatively abated progress in “down-states” (XTΠT ≤ K) of the function. Thus, this
utility-maximizing investor is indispensably concerned about achieving K in down-states,
whereas the same individual substantially loosens his/her anxiety in up-states.
Corollary 5.1. Consider sup{xt}t∈[0,T ]∈Â′X0
E [U (XT ,ΠT )] subject to the dynamic constraint
implicit in (3.36) for an investor with dual CRRA preferences (5.1). Then,
XoptT =
(
ηZ ν̂TΠT
)− 1
γd ΠT1{ηZ ν̂TΠT≥1} +
(
ηZ ν̂TΠT
)− 1
γu ΠT1{ηZ ν̂TΠT<1}
H (η) = η− 1γdE
[
M̂T
1− 1
γd
]
Xλ2γd
(
ηM̂T ≥ 1
)
+ η−
1
γuE
[
M̂T
1− 1
γu
]
Xλ2γu
(
ηM̂T < 1
)
,
(5.4)
in which Xλ2γi ∼ P are the measures generated by Xλ2γi = E
[
M̂T
1−1/γi]−1
M̂T
1−1/γi
for
41This is not a necessary requirement, any γd, γu ∈ R+ \ [0, 1] ensure proper specification of (5.1).
42The subsequent breakdown bears upon a sole terminal wealth setup; we restrict this analysis to U .
43Optimal portfolios ought to conform to a structure that concurs per instance with the CRRA demands.
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i ∈ S := {d, u}. The appurtenant pevisible RRA transformation then must follow
1
R2t
=
1
γd
Xλ2γd
(
Y optT ≥ BT
∣∣ Ft) Xγdt
Xoptt
+
1
γu
Xλ2γu
(
Y optT < BT
∣∣ Ft) Xγut
Xoptt
, where
Xγit = η
−1/γiE
[
M̂T
1−1/γi ∣∣∣ Ft] , Xoptt = E [Z ν̂t,TXoptT ∣∣ Ft] , and Z ν̂t,T = Z ν̂t −1Z ν̂T , (5.5)
such that R1t−1 = R2t−1 − 1 defines the proxy for transformed RRA, for all t ∈ [0, T ].44
Proof. The statements and associated proof rise effortlessly from Proposition 3.5.
Corollary 5.1 carries the expressions that institute the optimality conditions in step
with Proposition 3.5 for a dual CRRA agent (5.1). Note that closed-form expressions for
the optimal portfolio xoptt and the market fair value of wealth X
opt
t are hereupon readily
obtainable. The previous corollary chiefly discloses the analytical burden that may arise
with regard to a recuperation of the optimal shadow prices of non-traded risk. Let us
actualize this mathematical distress by inspecting the next expression
λ̂opt2,t
(G ′2t,T − G ′1t,T )−1 = 1−Xoptt (∑
i∈S
1
γi
Xλ2γi (Ai | Ft)Xγit
)−1
, (5.6)
which typifies the identity from which we can evoke the shadow prices, where we use
R2t (R1t )−1 = 1−R2t , for Ad = {Y optT ≥ BT}, Au = {Y optT < BT}. The probability weights
each depend onMT and non-linearly shelter {λ̂opt2,t }t∈[0,T ]. This path-dependency epitomizes
that a closed-form expression for λ̂opt2,t is not attainable. Withal, λ̂
opt
2,t is restricted to an
interval that diverges with the variation between γd and γu.45 Therefrom, approving that
P = Rm may provide a level-headed approximation to λ̂opt2,t for tenable γd, γu.
Letting γ := γd = γu recovers the standard isoelastic framework and furnishes
XoptT = X0E
[
M̂T
1−1/γ]
M̂T
−1/γ
ΠT , and λ̂
opt
2,t = (1− γ)
(G ′2t,T − G ′1t,T ) , (5.7)
wherefrom we infer that the shadow prices still mark off troublesome wholly forward-
backward equations, impelled by the fictitious hedging coefficients G ′2t,T and G ′1t,T . As
a result, the latter equality does not allow us to withdraw λ̂opt2,t in closed-form. Under
the supplementary premises that pit and rt are FW1t -measurable, and that ξΠ2t defines a
constant, as in for example Brennan and Xia (2002), the optimal shadow prices would
characterize constants as well: λ̂opt2,t = (1− γ) ξΠ2t . Whence, the optimal decisions xoptt
explicitly implant the two-fund separation principle, and thereby break down into
xoptt =
1
γ
σS1t
>−1
λ1,t +
(
1− 1
γ
)
σS1t
>−1 (G2x,t,T − G1x,t,T ) , (5.8)
44In accordance with Theorem 3.2, we use Y −10 B
−1
t Yt = Z
ν̂
t . Additionally, Y
opt
t embeds {λ̂opt2,s }s∈[0,t].
45Principally, the formula in (5.6) divulges that roughly λ̂opt2,t ∈ [(1− γd), (1− γu)](G′1t,T + G′2t,T ) for all
ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, T ]. Evidently, γd → γu could assist in diminishing the width of the foregoing interval
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Figure 2. Optimal allocation to stock. The figure depicts the optimal portfolio demand in relation to
real wealth. To that end, the plot relies on a reduced economic setting for a dual CRRA agent characterized
by (γd, γu) = (10, 2) and a reference level K = 1 (vertically dotted line). This reduced economy contains a
one-dimensional stock, for λ1,t = 0.343 and σS1t = 0.158, wherein rt = pit = 0 and Πt = 1, so that Xt/Πt
effectively reads Xt. Further, we set T = 1. Corollary 5.1’s statements suffice to derive the optimality
conditions. Here, γd−1λ1,t/σS1t and γu−1λ1,t/σtS1 define (resp.) the portfolio decisions’ floor and cap.
whereat Gjx,t,T , j = 1, 2 are completely spelled out thanks to the analytical existence of λ̂opt2,t .
This mathematical convenience provides a proper point of departure for the numerical
verification of the approximation technology underpinning P ⊆ D1,2 ([0, T ])m.
Let us return to the general dual CRRA case in which γd, γu ∈ R+ \ [0, 1]. Revisiting
Corollary 5.1 for such γd, γu, we detect an omnipresent weighting texture that characterizes
the optimal controls, x̂optt and X
opt
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T . To underscore this structure and related
idiosyncrasy, we pro tem restrict the analysis to the mean-variance hedge demand:
xm,optt =
1
γd
σS1t
>−1
λ1,tX
λ2
γd
(Ad | Ft) X
γd
t
Xoptt
+
1
γu
σS1t
>−1
λ1,tX
λ2
γu (Au | Ft)
Xγut
Xoptt
. (5.9)
These decisions corner wealth-dependent dynamics in consequence of the reciprocal in-
clusion of Xoptt , which could evade if and only if γd = γu. The weighting/interpolating
anatomy crops up within the projected RRA as a linear combination of the individually
detached CRRA demands 1
γd
σS1t
>−1
λ1,t and 1γuσ
S1
t
>−1
λ1,t along with the previsible con-
ditional probabilities.46 Expressly, for down-states of the world, Ad, the tangency rule
in (5.9) assigns more weight to 1
γd
σS1t
>−1
λ1,t so as to prevent the investor from further
dissatisfaction by executing a prudent investment strategy. In up-states, Au, the converse
is true, and xt spells out a less cautious strategy, due to achieved acquisition of K = 1.
46Absolute continuity infers that 1γd (σ
S1
t )
>−1λ1,t, 1γu (σ
S1
t )
>−1λ1,t emerge from Xλ2γd → 1, Xλ2γu → 1.
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Per illustration of the most typical features, Figure 2 displays xoptt in an economy
wherein the exclusive risky asset abides by one-dimensional St that embeds a constant
appreciation rate and volatility coefficient. The plot appertains to an agent, personified by
γd = 10 and γu = 2. We provide the allocation in relation to Xt/Πt deducible from
Xoptt Z
ν̂
t =
∑
i∈S
η−1/γiE
[
M̂T
1−1/γi ∣∣∣ Ft]Xλ2γ (Ai | Ft) (5.10)
All curves in this plot exhibit an interpolating design between the floor and cap around
K = 1, resembling shifts from prudent to less cautious investment behaviour in line with
Figure 1.47 Following the payoff of a European option, the cutoff points approach K = 1 for
t→ T , as the investor’s concerns and harmonious rapid anticipation increase towards the
planning horizon. The decisions indeed show trend-chasing behaviour, cf. Basak (2002).
Akin, though “fuzzier”, shapes apply to the more general multi-dimensional instances.
5.2 Brennan and Xia Environment
In furtherance of the numerical illustration that corroborates precision of the approximate
technique and relies on Brennan and Xia (2002)’s economic environment, we introduce
their model setup and pose congruent approximate optimality conditions in the spirit of
section 4. To align notation, we preserve the probabilistic schema in section 2.1, wherein
we replace Wt = [W 1t ,W 2t ]
> by the R4-valued ẑt = [zt, zu,t]
>. Further, introduce
drt = κ (r¯ − rt) dt+ σrdzr,t, r0 ∈ R+
dpit = α (p¯i − pit) dt+ σpidzpi,t, pi0 ∈ R+
(5.11)
as two single-factor Vasicek processes for respectively the instantaneous real interest rate
and the expected rate of inflation. We assume that that the therein assimilated parameters
live by the typical definitions. These processes unequivocally meet the regularity conditions
imposed on rt, pit in the generic financial model construction of section 2.1.
Specifically, identify the R3-valued standard Brownian motion as zt = [zs,t, zr,t, zpi,t]
>.
Hence, zu,t constitutes an undiversifiable source of risk. Correspondingly, inaugurate
dΠt = Πt
(
pitdt+ ξ
>zt + ξudzu,t
)
, Π0 = 1
dMt = Mt
(−rtdt+ φ>dzt + φudzu,t) , M0 = 1, (5.12)
as the simplified price index and real SPD, where ξ = [ξs, ξr, ξpi]
> ∈ R3 and φ =
[φs, φr, φpi]
> ∈ R3 characterize the constant factor loadings on zt. In agreement with
these dynamics, we let dZ λ̂ut = Z
λ̂u
t [−Rf,tdt − λ>dzt − λ̂u,tdzu,t], Z λ̂u0 = 1, where Z λ̂ut
47The CRRA exposures 1γd (σ
S1
t )
>−1λ1,t, 1γu (σ
S1
t )
>−1λ1,t do not always provoke the floors and caps of
xoptt in the economy of Figure 2. In the limit, the portfolio, however, converges to these extrema.
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represents the artificial nominal SPD, for an endogenous λ̂u,t ∈ D1,2 ([0, T ]). Here, zt
is independent from zu,t and internally dependent, implied by the correlation matrix
ρ ∈ [−1, 1]3×3, whose rows equate to (1, ρs,r, ρspi),(ρsr, 1, ρspi), (ρspi, ρs,r, 1).
The actual nominal pricing kernel surfaces from Zt = Mt/Πt and in part urges the
nominal rate Rf,t = rt + pit − ξ>λ− ξuλu. The asset menu48 then consists of
dSt = St [(Rf,t + λsσs) dt+ σsdzs,t] , S0 = 1
dPi,t = Pi,t
[(
Rf,t − υ>t,Tiσ̂PλP
)
dt− υ>t,Tiσ̂PdẑPt
]
, Pi = 1,
(5.13)
which respectively expound a stock, and two nominal bonds that differ on account of two
times to maturity Ti ∈ R+, i = 1, 2. In these stochastic differential equations, we define
vec(σ̂P ) = [σr, 0, 0, σpi], λP = [λr, λpi]>, and υt,Ti = [
1
σr
(1 − e−κ(T−t)), 1
σpi
(1 − e−α(T−t))]>
for notational appliance. Moreover, the market construction mandates that the constant
prices of financial risk obey λ = [λs, λr, λpi]> = ρ (ξ − φ) and λu = ξu − φu.
At last, we introduce the following two dynamic processes given that Λt = Σtλ:
dXt = Xt
[(
Rf,t + x
>
t Λt
)
dt+ x>t Σtdzt
]
, X0 ∈ R+,
dP3,t = P3,t
[(
Rf,t + σP3,tλ̂u,t
)
dt+ σP3,tdzu,t
]
, P3,0 = 1.
(5.14)
The first process constitutes the agent’s wealth dynamics, where we define xt as the
R3-valued Ft-measurable vector containing the proportions of Xt that the agent allocates
to the risky instruments. Herein, we assume that the portfolio weights satisfy x>t ΣtΣ>t xt ∈
L1 ([0, T ]), where Σt ∈ R3×3 accommodates the securities’ loadings on zt. Admissibility
of xt holds, if additionally Xt ≥ 0. The second process composes the fictitious asset, to
which xu,t of Xt is allocated. Admissibility of xu,t follows evenly from that of xt.
Approximate Optimality Dual
First, we analyse the approximate dual side of the terminal wealth problem in the previous
economy. For that purpose, consider Proposition 3.3 and curtail the space of feasible dual
controls λ̂u,t to P = R ⊂ D1,2 ([0, T ]). We intuitively verify this repression of the space in
the sequel. Tantamount to the results in section 4.3, this operation makes sure that the
dual problem generates analytical solutions, which gives rise to Corollary 5.2.
Corollary 5.2. Consider inf λ̂u,t∈R,η∈R+ E[V (ηZ
λ̂u
T ,ΠT )] + ηX0 for λ̂u,t ∈ P. Then49,
∑
i∈S
Xγi0 N
(
dMi0,T
)
= X0, & λ̂
U,∗
u,t =
1−X0(∑
i∈S
1
γi
N (dMi0,T )Xγi0
)−1 ξu, (5.15)
48The nominal bonds crop up as a consequence of the construction: Pi,t = E[Z−1t ZTi |Ft], Ti ≥ t.
Observe that we also include dBt = Rf,tBtdt, B0 = 1 in addition to St and Pi,t as part of the asset mix.
49In what follows, we denote by N (·) the CDF of a univariate standard normal random variable.
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for φ̂ =
[
φ,−λ̂U,∗u + ξu
]> such that λ̂u,t =: λ̂U,∗u,t . The value function hence agrees to
ĴU,opt (X0) =
ηXγd0
1− γdN
(
dMd0,T
)
+
ηXγu0
1− γuN
(−dMu0,T )+H (γd, γu) , (5.16)
in which H (γd, γu) = N (d1)1−γd +
N (−d1)
1−γu , for d1 = σ
M
T
−1 (
log
(
ηU,∗
)
+ µMT
)
, and
µMi0,T = (r¯ − r0)
1
σr
B0,T −
(
r¯ − ξu
(
λu − λ̂U,∗u
)
+
1
2
φ̂>ρ̂φ̂
)
T +
(
1− 1
γi
)
σMT
2
σMT
2
= φ̂>ρ̂φ̂T − σ
2
r
2κ2
(
2
(
1
σr
B0,T − T
)
+ σ−2r κB
2
0,T
)
− 2σr
κ
e>2 ρφ
(
T − 1
σr
B0,T
)
(5.17)
for i ∈ S and Bt,T := σrκ
(
1− e−κ(T−t)), where ρ̂ denotes the correlation matrix of ẑt. Then,
dMd0,T = σ
M
T
−1(
log
(
ηU,∗
)
+ µMd0,T
)
and dMu0,T = −σMT −1
(
log
(
ηU,∗
)
+ µMu0,T
)
. Furthermore,
Xγi0 = η
U,∗ exp
(
(1− 1/γi)µMT + 2−1σMT 2 (1− 1/γi)2
)
, i ∈ S. (5.18)
Proof. Note that µMT = µ
Mi
0,T−(1−1/γi)σMT 2: Corollary 5.1 suffices to derive the results.
Homologous to the approximate results in section 4.3, Corollary 5.2 efficaciously
discloses the results in Corollary 5.1 for t = 0 applied to the financial market under study.
Hence, closed-form approximate solutions emerge via the system of equations in (5.15). To
expound the call for an approximation to λ̂optu,t by λ̂
U,∗
u,t in (5.15), let us inspect the former’s
semi-analytic.50 Accordingly, let us note that G ′1t,T = −ξu and observe that G ′2t,T represents
a previsible process, which pursuant to Corollary 5.1 quarters {λ̂optu,s}s∈[t,T ] as
G ′2t,T = R2tE
[
XoptT Z
λ̂u
T
E
[
XoptT Z
λ̂u
T
∣∣ Ft]R−1x,T
(∫ T
t
Dzut φ̂optu,sdzu,s −
∫ T
t
Dzut φ̂optu,sds
) ∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
. (5.19)
Let us recall that the parameter φ̂optu,t = ξu − λ̂optu,t lodges the shadow price of non-traded
risk, in tandem with the fact that both XoptT Z
λ̂u
T and R−1x,T analogously encircle integral
representations enveloping λ̂optu,t , for any γd 6= γu. As a consequence, the possibly non-linear
dependency of G ′2t,T on the entire paths of the shadow price is indisputable. In virtue of
the results in Corollary 5.1, the analytical identity from which we may restore the truly
optimal shadow price λ̂optu,t thereupon follows similarly from (5.6) and ought to obey
λ̂optu,t
(G ′2t,T + ξu)−1 = 1−Xt
(∑
i∈S
1
γi
Xλ2γi (Ai | Ft)Xγit
)−1
, (5.20)
which we cannot solve for all γd, γu ∈ R+ \ [0, 1] such that γd 6= γu, due to the aforestated
path-dependency. In other words, λ̂optu,t is solely acquirable for CRRA preferences, γd = γu.
50Let us remark that for example XoptT as well as η
opt are in this instance latent in Corollary 5.1.
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In that case, G ′2t,T disappears alongside the path-dependent probability weights, culminating
in λ̂optu,t = (1− γ) ξu; the approximation is exact under P = R for CRRA investors. For
any γd, γu ∈ R+ \ [0, 1], we find that roughly λ̂opt2,t ∈ [(1− γd) , (1− γu)]
(G ′2t,T + ξu). On
those grounds, letting P = R is sensible in consideration of approximation purposes.
Approximate Optimality Primal
The suppression of D1,2 ([0, T ]) to P = R on the dual side sets out totally analytical
expressions, amongst which an upper bound on the value function ĴU (X0). In spite of
this mathematical facility, it fails to procreate feasible portfolio decisions. Accordant with
the technique in section 4.3, we avail of the optimality criterion implicit in Corollary 5.1
for the artificial portfolio rules x̂optt and project it onto the feasible region of xt’s:
X∗T = X0 +
∫ T
0
(
Rf,t + x
opt,>
t
∣∣
λ̂u,t∈RΛt
)
X∗t dt+
∫ T
0
xopt,>t
∣∣
λ̂u,t∈RΣtX
∗
t dzt, (5.21)
results, in which we let xoptt |λ̂u,t∈R be the baseline-optimal portfolio rules x
opt
t that arise
out of Collary 5.2, with inclusion of some deterministic shadow price λ̂u,t := λ̂L,∗u,t ∈ R. To
obtain the foregoing admissible approximation, we rely on a projection kernel similar to
(4.14), which nullifies any remaining allocation to the fictitious security P3,t. Corollary 5.3
contains the congruous approximate portfolio weights for an unspecified λ̂L,∗u,t ∈ R.
Corollary 5.3. Consider x̂optt implicit in Corollary 5.2 for xu,t = 0. Consequently,
x¯∗t = (−At,T + λ)
∑
i∈S
1
γi
Xγit
Xt
∗N
(
dMit,T
(
1− 21{i=u}
))
+ At,T , (5.22)
where x¯∗t = Σ>t x∗t for x∗t := x
opt
t |λ̂u,t∈R, and At,T = −Bt,T e2 + ξ, along with X
γi
t =
E
[
η−1/γiM̂1−1/γiT
∣∣ Ft]. More, let dMit,T = (σMt,T )−1 (log (ηL,∗Mt)+ µMit,T ), and
µMit,T =
(
r¯ − ξu
(
λu − λ̂L,∗u
)
+
1
2
φ̂>ρ̂φ̂
)
∆T,t + (r¯ − rt) Bt,T
σr
+
(
1− 1
γi
)
σMt,T
2
σMt,T
2
= φ̂>ρ̂φ̂(T − t)− σ
2
r
κ2
(
Bt,T
σr
−∆t,T +
κB2t,T
2σ2r
)
− 2σr
κ
e>2 ρφ
(
∆t,T − Bt,T
σr
) (5.23)
for i ∈ S and ∆t,T := T − t. Then, X∗T is budget-feasible for all ηL,∗ ∈ R. Further,
X∗t = X
γd
t Z
λ̂u
t N
(
dMdt,T
)
+Xγut Z
λ̂u
t N
(−dMut,T ) , (5.24)
which singularizes the market value of I
(
B−1T Y
opt
T ,ΠT
)
evaluated at any time t ∈ [0, T ].
Notice that the value function ĴL (X0) for (5.22) is not available in closed-form.
Proof. Here, Xγit = ηL,∗
−1/γiM̂1−1/γit exp
(
(1− 1/γi)µMit,T − 12σMt,T
2
(1− 1/γi)2
)
, i ∈ S.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
St Zt rt pit
σs 0.158 φS −0.333 r¯ 0.012 p¯i 0.054
λs 0.343 φr 0.170 κ 0.613 α 0.027
λu 0.027 φpi 0.120 σr 0.026 σpi 0.014
ρsr −0.129 φu −0.014 λr −0.209 λpi −0.105
ξu 0.013 ρspi −0.024 ρrpi −0.061
Table 1. Parameter input. This table reports the benchmark parameter input that we employ in
providing the numerical illustrations. The values in this table are identical to those that are documented
in Table 1 of Brennan and Xia (2002). We complement their baseline parameters by explicit values for λu
and φu, that we set equal to the means of their counterparts λ and φ. More, note that ξ = 03 holds. We
keep the benchmark planning horizons fixed at T = 5 and/or T = 10, as unambiguously indicated.
The prior proposition particularizes without regard to the in closed-form non-existent
ηL,∗ ∈ R+ and λ̂L,∗u,t ∈ R, an analytically tractable approximation to the optimal portfolio
rules concealed in an application of Corollary 5.1 to the economy at hand.51 To avoid
numerical optimization approaches in an attempt to identify these controls, we may utilize
the rules (5.22) in the sense of p̂rojÂ′PX0
. Then, we insert the controls of Corollary 5.2 into
the one above for full identification. Compared with projÂ′PX0
, wherefore
ĴL,opt (X0) = sup
λ̂L,∗u,t ∈R,ηL,∗∈R+
E [U (X∗T ,ΠT )] (5.25)
must provoke the optimal primal controls, we discern the potential numerical burden, cf.
section 4.2. Subsequently, we compare the two approaches. In either case, we arrive at
closed-form expressions for the optimal portfolio composition, which accompany lower and
upper bounds, ĴL,opt and ĴU,opt on the optimal value function. The gap, DR
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
,
ensues easily and the harmonious CV must be determined numerically, see section 4.2.
5.3 Main Numerical Results
We progress by assessing the performance of the approximate method in the preceding
economy for P = R and dual CRRA individuals on the basis of a couple of numerical
examples. Towards this end, we put the benchmark parameter input as reported in Brennan
and Xia (2002) to use. Tangibly, Table 1 records these benchmark values. The results
appearing in this subsection arise as a consequence of N = 10, 000 simulated paths for time
increments ∆ti = 0.05 as part of an Euler scheme, such that M = T/0.05. We consider
two planning horizons, T = 5 and T = 10, because the therein inherently visible patterns
carry over to extensions of these terminal dates. In addition to that, we study three dual
51For financial intuition applicable to the previous two corollaries, see the analysis around Corollary 5.1.
Throughout, we set DR
(
θ̂L,∗, θ̂U,∗t
)
= ĴU,opt − ĴL,opt, for θ̂L,∗t =
(
λ̂L,∗u,t , η
L,∗) and θ̂U,∗ = (λ̂U,∗u,t , ηU,∗).
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γ1 γ2 γ3 γ1 γ2 γ3
T = 5 T = 10
LB 0.135 0.234 0.178 0.193 0.416 0.292
(0.133, 0.137) (0.229, 0.239) (0.175, 0.181) (0.192, 0.195) (0.410, 0.422) (0.289, 0.295)
UB 0.136 0.235 0.181 0.194 0.419 0.295
CV 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004
AL 1.664 2.314 4.308 1.885 4.600 4.219
θ¯L (0.052, 0.458) (0.034, 0.965) (0.052, 0.778) (0.052, 0.225) (0.031, 0.745) (0.048, 0.495)
θ¯U (0.052, 0.458) (0.030, 0.950) (0.046, 0.754) (0.052, 0.225) (0.026, 0.720) (0.041, 0.478)
Table 2. Duality gaps, welfare losses and parameters. The table reports the estimated lower
bounds (rows marked LB) and analytically derived upper bounds (rows marked UB) on the optimal value
function. In parentheses, the approximate 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The rows marked CV
and AL document (resp.) the compensating variations and annual welfare losses. Additionally, the rows
labelled θ¯L :=
( − λ̂L,∗u,t , ηL,∗) and θ¯U := ( − λ̂U,∗u,t , ηU,∗) document the Lagrange multiplier and shadow
price from the primal and the dual (resp.). The lower bounds materialize from inserting θ̂U,∗t into the
primal objective. The results rely on N = 10, 000 paths for ∆ti = 0.05 time-steps, and X0 = 1. The set
(γd, γu) ∈ {(5, 5) , (10, 2) , (15, 3)} abbreviated by {γ1, γ2, γ3} comprises the dual CRRA risk-profiles.
CRRA investors whose risk-profiles conform to (γd, γu) ∈ {(5, 5) , (10, 2) , (15, 3)} for a
benchmark level and endowment equally identified with K = X0 = 1. The first element
of the previous set mirrors the preferences of a standard CRRA agent, which we include
for the sake of a validity check. That is to say, the approximation is exact for CRRA
individuals, from where DR
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
= 0 must modulo numerical errors hold. For the
remaining two investors, their risk-profiles diverge in form of the coefficients of risk-aversion
which leads to inexact approximations: DR
(
θ̂L,∗t , θ̂
U,∗
t
)
> 0 ought to be true.52 Lastly, in
opposition to Bick et al. (2013), we do not simulate the upper bound ĴU (X0) in order to
preclude estimations biases concerning the compensating variations. Rather, we utilize
the analytical bound to emphasize the method’s accuracy.
Table 2 resumes the lower and upper bounds on the optimal value function attributable
to the approximating mechanism in Section 4.2, as well as the homologous compensating
variations and annual welfare losses in basis points (bp) of the initial endowment; the
“naive” and true procedures engender identical outcomes, wherefore we also present the
optimal parameters.53 We addedly accompany the estimated lower bounds with their
agreeable 95% confidence intervals. Preferably, these confidence bands occlude the upper
bound, inasmuch as ĴL (X0) in (4.8) outlines a point estimate. Table 2 in total gives a
strong indication of our technique being near-optimal. Notably, the duality gaps vary
from 0.001 for the T = 5 CRRA agent to 0.002 in regard to the T = 10, γ3 dual CRRA
agent. Apart from these negligible differences, the confidence intervals enfold the upper
52The width of the discrepancy between the uncoupled levels of risk-aversion differs for these investors.
We note that the approximation’s precision practically decreases with this width according to (5.20).
53By the “naive” approach, we indicate the approximate method that involves the p̂rojÂ′PX0
projection.
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Figure 3. Probability density horizon wealth. The figure displays the probability density functions
of the optimal and the “naively” approximated near-optimal terminal real wealth associated with (resp.)
an isoelastic agent and a dual CRRA agent. The coefficients of risk-aversion adhere to γ = 5 and
(γd, γu) = (10, 2) for the (resp.) CRRA and dual CRRA investors. The benchmark reads K = 1 (vertically
dotted line). Both densities emanate from kernel density estimation with a bandwidth equal to 0.15 in
application to the simulated wealth equation (4.8), based on T = 5 for N = 10, 000 with M = 100.
bounds, alluding in unison to accuracy. Economically quantifying the degree of these gaps’
width, we observe that the breadth of the compensating variations and especially the
annual welfare losses ratify this statement on the question of precision. The sizes of the
annual welfare losses concretely range between 1.664 bp for the T = 5 CRRA individual
to 4.600 bp for the T = 10, γ2 dual CRRA agent.54 If we follow the interpretation of “AL”
as a representative investor’s annual management fee, the exiguity of these quantities is
apparent. Furthermore, the insignificant optimality gaps for the CRRA investor verify the
method’s legitimacy. On a final note, the impalpable dissimilarities between θ̂L,∗t and θ̂
U,∗
t
jointly with identical performance make the numerical effort redundant.
We note that the CV’s and confidence intervals increase with T . However, the AL’s
remain unaffected, which suggests annual stability in the method’s performance. Intuitively,
the aberration of the approximate xt from the true xoptt is subjected to an extended stream
of zu,t for higher T and thus accumulates more outwardly for expanded T . Table 2
furthermore reveals that besides the size of the dissimilitude in levels of risk-aversion,
the individual magnitudes of γd and γu affect the approximation’s potency. Observe
that the risk-profile of γ3 is quantitatively more widespread than that of γ2, whereas
the approximation to xoptt is moderately more accurate for γ3. The overall coefficients
54From this perspective, these annual welfare losses construe the mere meaningful touchstones, because
of their practical and financial pertinence, along with the dissimilarity in the planning horizons.
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of risk-aversion comprised within the γ3 profile outweighing those within the γ2 profile
exemplify the necessary nuance to the rule. Leastwise, Corollaries 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrate
that the piecewise variety of the rules abates with boosts in the risk-profiles as a whole.
Hence, xoptt for the γ3 agent are less sensitive to economic shocks, making the constant
approximation to λ̂optu,t more eloquent. Lastly, in Figure 3, we depict the densities for
XT/ΠT of the CRRA and dual CRRA agents. The right-skewed nature of the latter shows
that the dual CRRA function invokes a rough guarantee near the desired benchmark.55
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed and assessed a computationally tractable method based on closed-
form expressions allowing us to near-optimally approximate portfolio weights in imperfect
environments that populate finite-horizon investors with non-trivial preferences. The
procedure evades the unexceptional absence of analytical formulae in such circumstances
by projecting the optimal closed-form portfolio composition in an artificial market onto the
admissible region whilst confining the shadow prices to some suitable parametric family.
As a consequence, the technique obtains explicit identities for the investments decisions
that mimic the truly optimal rules up to the shadow prices.
Optimality gaps unique to this method emerge as a result of convex duality and
serve as concise evaluators of the technique’s accuracy. We have accordingly tested the
method in a model that accommodates unspanned inflation risk and occupies an agent
with ratio dual CRRA preferences. Insignificant gaps and annual welfare losses varying
between 1 and 5 basis points for different investors suggest precision of the method, cf.
section 4. The general mechanism, cf. sections 3 and 4, is notwithstanding the studied
illustration applicable under investment constraints to a more far-reaching class of models
that admittedly encompass non-Markovian dynamics and state-dependent preferences.
Appendix
Appendix A Auxiliary Results
Let us firstly introduce the notion of a Fréchet derivative
Definition A.1 (Fréchet Derivative). Let V and W be two Banach spaces, and consider a mapping
G : V →W. (A.1)
Furthermore, introduce a set U that complies with V ⊂ U . Then, G is called Fréchet differentiable at
55This is a logical consequence of the results in section 5.1, see Kamma et al. (2019) for further details.
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X ∈ V if there exists an A : U →W that satisfies in addition to ‖Az‖W ≤M‖z‖U the following
lim
h→0
‖h‖V −1‖G (X + h)−G (X)−Ah‖W = 0, (A.2)
for some M ∈ R+ and all z ∈ U . The Fréchet derivative at hand reads DXF = A.
Secondly, let us turn to the Malliavin calculus. The next theorem embodies the Clark-Ocone formula
Theorem A.1 (Clark-Ocone). Suppose that F : C0 ([0, T ])→ R satisfies F ∈ D1,2. Then,
F = E [F ] +
∫ T
0
E [DtF | Ft] dWt. (A.3)
Specifically regarding martingales, (A.3) furnishes an adequate tool to uniquely identify the integrand
in their martingale representation. Ultimately, the next theorem introduces the Skorokhod operator.
Theorem A.2 (Skorokhod Operator). Consider some F : C0 ([0, T ])→ R such that F ∈ D1,2. Then,
E [Fδ (h)] = E
[
F
∫ T
0
hsdWs
]
= E
[∫ T
0
DsFhsds
]
= E
[
〈DF, h〉L2([0,T ])
]
, (A.4)
for all F ∈ D1,2 and h ∈ Dom (δ), where the divergence operator, or Skorokhod integral lives by
δ (Fh) = F
∫ T
0
hsdWs −
∫ T
0
DsF, hsds, (A.5)
in which its domain reads Dom (δ) :=
{
h ∈ L2 (Ω;L2 ([0, T ])) | ∣∣∣E [〈DF, h〉L2([0,T ])]∣∣∣ ≤ c‖F‖L2(Ω)}.
Observe that these results hold for functionals on the Wiener space as countoured in the main text
For proofs, consider Chapter 4.41 of Rogers and Williams (2000) or section 1.3.3 of Nualart (2006).
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